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  When Congress amended U.S. immigration law via the Refugee 
Act of 1980, it did so with the explicit purpose of bringing U.S. asylum 
law into conformity with the nation’s international refugee treaty 
obligations. Nevertheless, U.S. courts interpreting domestic asylum 
provisions routinely discount international legal norms, laboring 
under the mistaken perception that the Chevron doctrine requires 
deference to the executive agency’s interpretation of asylum law 
regardless of its compatibility with international law. As a result, 
domestic asylum law has become jurisprudentially unmoored from 
international refugee law to the serious detriment of asylum seekers. 
  This Article argues that neither Chevron nor the policies 
underlying it compel the lockstep deference that courts afford the 
Board of Immigration Appeals’ interpretation of U.S. asylum law. 
The Article charts two alternate paths by which courts may reject 
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agency statutory interpretations that are inconsistent with 
international refugee law: a route through Chevron that navigates 
within existing Supreme Court jurisprudence, and a route beyond 
Chevron based on the limited applicability of this administrative law 
doctrine to the asylum-adjudication context. Addressing further 
impediments to the reconciliation of domestic and international law, 
the Article demonstrates that courts are indeed capable of applying a 
coherent interpretive methodology to determine the content of refugee 
treaty obligations, particularly if engaged by government lawyers 
committed to reestablishing the international legality of U.S. practice. 
  In seeking to remove a fundamental administrative law obstacle to 
the implementation of international refugee law, the Article lends 
impetus to broader scholarly efforts to align U.S. law with this 
nation’s international human rights obligations. It also provides a 
framework that enables courts, immigration attorneys, and 
government policymakers to situate U.S. asylum law in the more 
rights-protective context that Congress intended. 
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Asylum law is one of the most thoroughly international areas of 
U.S. law. Not only has the United States ratified the core 
international refugee law treaty,1 but Congress, in passing the 
Refugee Act of 1980, has adopted implementing legislation with the 
 
 1. In 1968, the United States ratified the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 
31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, obligating it to comply with the substantive 
provisions of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 
189 U.N.T.S. 150. See infra Part I.A.1. 
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explicit purpose of bringing U.S. law into conformity with the nation’s 
international obligations under the treaty.2 Domestic statutory 
provisions deliberately track the language of the treaty’s central 
prohibition against removal of individuals to persecution, as well as 
the treaty’s definition of a refugee.3 The United States is a 
longstanding member of the Executive Committee of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),4 the 
international agency mandated with supervising the application of 
treaties relating to refugees. And one would be hard pressed to find 
areas of legal regulation that are inherently more international than 
the transnational flight of foreign nationals to the United States and 
similarly situated foreign states around the world. 
Given U.S. asylum law’s express international law 
underpinnings, one would expect U.S. courts interpreting it to employ 
international law norms, or at least to set aside the general resistance 
U.S. courts regularly display toward foreign and international law.5 
Yet courts have been surprisingly willing to discount international law 
governing domestic asylum statutes by deferring to expansive 
executive agency statutory interpretations that do not conform—and 
 
 2. Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), to bring U.S. law into conformity with the nation’s 
obligations under the Protocol. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 17–18 (1979) (describing changes 
to the law made to satisfy the Protocol’s obligations). See infra Part I.A.2. 
 3. Compare Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1, 19 U.S.T. at 
6261, 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152, 176, with 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006), and 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(A); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437 (1987) (“Indeed, the 
definition of ‘refugee’ that Congress adopted . . . is virtually identical to the one prescribed by 
Article 1(2) of the Convention . . . .”). 
 4. The UNHCR Executive Committee is an intergovernmental group that advises the 
UNHCR in the exercise of its protection mandate. It meets annually and publishes its 
discussions in Conclusions on International Protection. 
 5. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
basic premise of the Court’s argument—that American law should conform to the laws of the 
rest of the world—ought to be rejected out of hand.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 325 
(2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“For if it is evidence of a national consensus for which we 
are looking, then the viewpoints of other countries [on the execution of mentally disabled 
persons] are simply not relevant.”); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. 
Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 471 (2006) (statement of Samuel A. Alito, Jr.) (“I think 
the framers would be stunned by the idea that the Bill of Rights is to be interpreted by taking a 
poll of the countries of the world.”). See generally David Zaring, The Use of Foreign Decisions 
by Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 297, 297 (2006) 
(“[F]ederal courts rarely cite to foreign decisions, they do so no more now than they did in the 
past, and on those few occasions where they do cite to foreign decisions, it’s usually not to help 
them interpret domestic law.”). 
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in many cases, have made no effort to conform—to limitations 
created by U.S. international treaty obligations.6 Preferencing 
administrative agency interpretations over international legal 
obligations is not simply an academic concern. Writing in the late 
1990s, Professor Joan Fitzpatrick aptly observed that because the 
international refugee law framework has a rights-protective purpose,7 
“divorcing international and domestic law tends to operate to the 
grave detriment of asylum seekers.”8 In contrast with other areas of 
administrative regulation, the “grave detriment” to which she refers is 
not the loss of a benefit or the imposition of an economic burden. 
Favoring agency interpretations that frequently maximize executive 
deportation powers effectively strips refugees of their international 
treaty protections and enables the U.S. government to deport them to 
countries in which they face persecution. This result is perversely at 
odds with Congress’s intention that the domestic Refugee Act would 
create an asylum policy “consistent with this country’s tradition of 
welcoming the oppressed of other nations and with our obligations 
under international law.”9 
Fitzpatrick explained that domestic asylum law had become 
unmoored from international refugee law for two basic reasons: first, 
because U.S. courts “lack [a] coherent methodology for approaching 
international law,” and second, because of “a lack of systematic 
commitment to preserving the international legality of U.S. 
practice.”10 This Article explores a third related and often-ignored 
reason that U.S. international obligations toward refugees have been 
diluted: excessive judicial deference to the Board of Immigration 
 
 6. See infra Part I.B; see also Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of U.S. 
Refugee Law, 15 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (1997) (“Ignoring the unusual prominence of 
international standards in shaping domestic refugee law, some administrators and courts resist 
international constraints.”); John S. Kane, Refining Chevron—Restoring Judicial Review to 
Protect Religious Refugees, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 513, 516 & n.12 (2008) (arguing that the 
“excessive judicial deference to restrictive BIA decisions” in refugee cases is a result of courts 
misreading the Chevron doctrine). 
 7. The Convention generally provides a more rights-protective framework than domestic 
statutes alone because, at the very least, the Convention’s provisions must be interpreted in light 
of its humanitarian purpose, affording greater protection to refugees in cases of doubt. See infra 
notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
 8. Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 12. She further observed that “[i]f left unprotected by 
domestically enforceable international norms, asylum-seekers are at risk of arbitrary 
refoulement, especially during periods of heightened concern about foreign policy, border 
control or absorptive capacity.” Id. 
 9. H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 17–18 (1979). 
 10. Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 3–4. 
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Appeals (BIA) under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.11 The Chevron doctrine instructs courts to defer 
to the reasonable statutory interpretation of the agency charged with 
administering a statute in cases when Congress does not express a 
clear intent about the interpretation of the statute.12 Throughout the 
life of the Refugee Act, U.S. courts have been laboring under the 
mistaken perception that they are bound, under the Chevron 
doctrine, to defer to the BIA’s construction of U.S. refugee statutes, 
regardless of whether that construction is consistent with 
international law. Accordingly, U.S. courts, if they reference it at all, 
regularly treat international law as a persuasive, nonbinding guide 
that is trumped by Chevron deference to a BIA interpretation, even if 
that interpretation is inconsistent with international law. Similarly, 
because of their failure to adopt a coherent methodology to 
determine the meaning of refugee treaty provisions, U.S. courts 
erroneously assume that textual ambiguity in those provisions 
indicates ambiguity in congressional intent to comply with the treaty. 
Courts, in turn, interpret this perceived ambiguity in congressional 
intent to warrant agency deference under Chevron. As a 
consequence, U.S. courts are often persuaded by government lawyers 
to interpret the statute in a manner that prioritizes executive 
discretion over the requirements of international law. 
Though deference to agency judgment is sensible in many areas 
of statutory interpretation, neither Chevron nor the policies 
underlying it compel the lockstep deference that courts afford the 
BIA’s construction of asylum provisions. Indeed, reflexive deference 
is inconsistent with congressional intent to conform domestic asylum 
law to the nation’s international obligations.13 To resolve this tension, 
this Article charts two alternate paths through which courts may 
reject BIA statutory interpretations that are inconsistent with 
international refugee law. The first provides a path through Chevron, 
navigating within existing Supreme Court jurisprudence. The second 
offers a path beyond Chevron, grounded in the doctrine’s limited 
applicability to the distinct domain of judicial review of BIA 
interpretations of asylum law. 
Part I of this Article sets out the relevant international and 
domestic refugee law frameworks. It lays out the interpretive 
 
 11. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 12. Id. at 843–44. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
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principles by which federal judges may determine the content of U.S. 
international obligations, including the meaning of the United 
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(Convention)14 provisions that underpin the domestic statute. It then 
demonstrates the unsystematic methods by which federal judges 
disregard these interpretive principles and simply defer under 
Chevron to the BIA’s statutory construction, even when the Agency’s 
interpretation is neither derived from nor reconciled with 
corresponding treaty provisions. An emblematic example of this is the 
deference shown by seven courts of appeals to the BIA interpretation 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act’s provision permitting 
removal of individuals who pose a danger to the community to 
countries where their life or freedom might be threatened.15 All seven 
circuits deferred to the BIA even though the statute mirrors the 
Convention, and the BIA’s interpretation is directly at odds with 
relative international consensus on the meaning of the corresponding 
treaty provision. 
Part II discusses the three leading cases in which the Supreme 
Court has applied the Chevron framework to Refugee Act provisions: 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca16 in 1987, INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre17 in 1999, 
and Negusie v. Holder18 in 2009. These cases reveal the Court’s lack of 
a coherent approach to the role of international law in construing 
domestic asylum provisions, and its lack of a consistent methodology 
for interpreting the Convention’s terms. 
Parts III and IV set forth the two alternate paths through which 
courts may reject BIA statutory interpretations that are inconsistent 
with the Convention. Part III addresses the path through Chevron. It 
maintains that courts may reject outright a Convention-incompatible 
interpretation as inconsistent with congressional intent to achieve 
conformity with the Convention, absent a clear indication to the 
contrary. Alternatively, courts may apply various canons of statutory 
construction to find that a Convention-incompatible interpretation is 
not reasonable under Chevron. 
Part IV, in contrast, offers an alternate path beyond Chevron. It 
contends that the traditional rationales of agency expertise and 
 
 14. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1. 
 15. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 16. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
 17. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999). 
 18. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009). 
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political accountability underpinning Chevron deference may not 
apply to the BIA’s interpretation of asylum provisions, particularly in 
light of systemic problems in the operation of the BIA and 
immigration courts, and the unique international framework 
underlying domestic refugee law. Because of the statute’s treaty 
underpinning that defines the legal boundaries of executive conduct 
with respect to refugees, the Chevron doctrine raises specific 
separation-of-powers concerns in the asylum context by allowing the 
executive to redefine the limits of its power. 
Part V considers the obstacles—other than Chevron deference—
that prevent U.S. courts from properly reconnecting domestic and 
international refugee law. It recognizes that even setting Chevron 
deference aside, courts must apply a more coherent methodology 
when interpreting international law, and the government and 
judiciary must commit to preserving the international legality of U.S. 
practice. I argue that these hurdles to a more internationally engaged 
judiciary are not as difficult to overcome as might be supposed, and 
that overcoming them is in the national interest. The Article 
concludes that, as the United States engages in a process of 
reinvigorating the role of the United Nations and international 
institutions,19 judicial reengagement (or in many cases, engagement) 
with international law in this area may be more feasible than one 
might expect. 
I.  DEFERENCE AND DIVERSION: STRAYING FROM THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK 
A. The International and Domestic Refugee Law Framework 
1. The International Refugee Law Framework.  The core 
international treaty governing refugees is the 1951 United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,20 to which 144 states 
are party.21 Drafted in the aftermath of the Second World War, the 
 
 19. President Barack Obama received the Nobel Peace Prize for stewarding the United 
States in this direction within the first year of his presidency. See Press Release, Norwegian 
Nobel Comm., The Nobel Peace Prize for 2009 (Oct. 9, 2009), available at http://nobelprize.org/
nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/press.html. 
 20. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1. 
 21. Status of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, UNITED 
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/home.aspx (follow the “Status of Treaties 
(MTDSG)” hyperlink; then follow the “CHAPTER V” hyperlink; then follow the “Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees. Geneva, 28 July 1951” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 5, 2011). 
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Convention grew out of the recognition in the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of the right to seek and enjoy asylum 
from persecution.22 The Convention defines a “refugee” as a person 
who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion” is unable or unwilling to return to the country of his 
or her nationality.23 Owing to its historical context, however, Article 1 
of the Convention restricted the definition of “refugee” to those who 
became refugees by reason of events occurring before January 1, 
1951.24 In 1967, a new Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees25 
(Protocol) came into force, obligating states to apply the substantive 
provisions of the Convention26 to refugees without any temporal or 
geographical limitation.27 Although the United States never ratified 
the Convention, it acceded to the Protocol in 1968 and is therefore 
bound by all of the substantive provisions of the Convention.28 
The cornerstone of international refugee protection is the 
prohibition against refoulement—the return of a person to 
persecution—embodied in Article 33 of the Convention.29 This 
principle is now so widely accepted that it has attained the status of 
 
 22. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 14, U.N. GAOR, 
3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, at 74 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 23. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6261, 189 
U.N.T.S. at 152. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1. 
 26. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1, arts. 2–34, 19 U.S.T. at 
6264–76, 189 U.N.T.S. at 156–76. 
 27. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 
U.N.T.S. at 268–69. 
 28. The Protocol has 145 states parties. Status of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/home.aspx 
(follow “Status of Treaties (MTDSG)” hyperlink; then follow “CHAPTER V” hyperlink; then 
follow “Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. New York, 31 January 1967” hyperlink) 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2011). The United States is one of only a handful of states that is party to the 
Protocol but not the Convention (most states are party to both). Given the cross-referential 
relationship between the Protocol and Convention, this Article will use the terms “Convention” 
and “Protocol” interchangeably when referring to the United States’ international refugee law 
obligations. 
 29. Article 33(1) of the Convention provides: “No Contracting State shall expel or return 
(‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.” Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
supra note 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176. 
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customary international law.30 The protection against refoulement 
may only be withdrawn under the limited circumstances set forth in 
Article 33(2) of the Convention, namely when a person presents a 
threat to national security or to the safety of the community.31 Article 
1F of the Convention excludes individuals from refugee status if there 
are “serious reasons for considering” that the individual has 
previously committed certain heinous acts.32 
2. Congress Intended Congruence: Domestic Implementation of 
the Convention via the Refugee Act.  In 1980, Congress passed the 
Refugee Act,33 which amended the Immigration and Nationality Act 
of 1952 (INA).34 Unlike most other areas of law,35 the legislative 
 
 30. See, e.g., Ministerial Meeting of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Dec. 12–13, 2001, Declaration of States Parties to the 
1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 4, U.N. 
Doc. HCR/MMSP/2001/09 (Jan. 16, 2002) (noting “the continuing relevance and resilience of 
this international regime of rights and principles, including at its core the principle of non-
refoulement, whose applicability is embedded in customary international law”); see also ELIHU 
LAUTERPACHT & DANIEL BETHLEHEM, THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF 
NON-REFOULEMENT: OPINION ¶ 216, at 149 (2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/publ/
PUBL/419c75ce4.pdf (“[N]on-refoulement must be regarded as a principle of customary 
international law.”); AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS ACROSS 
BORDERS 123 (Louis B. Sohn & Thomas Buergenthal eds., 1992) (“[Nonrefoulement] has 
become a rule of customary international law, a generally accepted principle.”). For the 
application of principles of statutory construction to the nonrefoulement obligation as 
customary international law, see infra note 234. 
 31. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 
U.N.T.S. at 176. Under the Convention framework, the exceptions to the nonrefoulement 
obligation under Article 33 are invoked, if applicable, after an individual has been determined 
to be a refugee. These exceptions were intended to be construed narrowly. See infra note 76 and 
accompanying text. 
 32. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6263–64, 189 
U.N.T.S. at 156. In contrast to Article 33, under the international framework these were 
intended to be considered at the time of the initial assessment of whether an individual satisfies 
the refugee definition. U.S. law does not reflect this distinction, instead grouping the Article 
33(2) exceptions and Article 1F exclusionary clauses together. 
 33. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 34. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006)). 
 35. One important exception is legislation and regulations governing relief from removal 
based on the Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), which reflect similar congressional intent to conform U.S. law 
with the nation’s international obligations under that convention. The United States Senate 
advised and consented to the ratification of CAT on October 27, 1990. 136 CONG. REC. 36,192–
99 (1990). In 1998, Congress implemented the United States’ obligations under CAT into 
domestic law, through the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA), 
Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-761, -822 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 
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history of the Refugee Act explicitly acknowledges congressional 
intent to bring the domestic laws of the United States into full 
conformity with the nation’s international obligations under the 
Protocol, specifically with respect to Article 1 (refugee status) and 
Article 33 (nonrefoulement) of the Convention.36 The House 
Judiciary Committee described the amendments as necessary “so that 
U.S. statutory law clearly reflects our legal obligations under 
international agreements.”37 The Committee determined that it was 
“both necessary and desirable that United States domestic law 
include [Article 33 of the Convention]” in the withholding of 
deportation provision, and that it was “desirable, for the sake of 
clarity, to conform the language of that section to the Convention.”38 
In this respect, the Refugee Act is one of a small number of 
incorporative statutes that directly incorporate international treaty 
language and concepts into U.S. domestic law.39 
 
note). In enacting FARRA, Congress elected to give U.S. obligations under CAT “wholesale 
effect” under U.S. domestic law. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 U.S. 1346, 1365 (2008) (noting that 
FARRA “direct[s] the ‘appropriate agencies’ to ‘prescribe regulations to implement the 
obligations of the United States under Article 3’ of” CAT (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note)); see 
also Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 68 (3d Cir. 2007) (“FARRA implements U.S. 
obligations under CAT.”). Indeed, section 2242(f)(2) of FARRA explicitly states that “the 
terms used in this section have the meanings given those terms in the Convention, subject to any 
reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos contained in the United States Senate 
resolution of ratification of the Convention.” FARRA § 2242(f)(2), 112 Stat. at 2681-823. 
Arguments concerning the application of international law to the interpretation of asylum 
provisions may thus apply equally to the torture protection provisions of the immigration 
statute. 
 36. See Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative 
History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 40–41, 60 (1981) (noting that the 
U.S. definition of refugee “adopted the UN definition,” and that the statute as a whole was 
drafted while considering U.S. “obligations under the Protocol”). 
 37. H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 18 (1979). 
 38. Id. Congress gave numerous other indications of its intent to conform the Refugee Act 
with U.S. obligations under the Convention. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-781, at 19–20 (1980) (Conf. 
Rep.), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 160, 160–61 (adopting the “internationally-accepted 
definition of refugee contained in the U.N. Convention and Protocol” and noting that the 
withholding of removal provision is to be “construed consistent with the Protocol”); H.R. REP. 
NO. 96-608, at 9–10 (stating that the Act will “finally bring United States law into conformity 
with the internationally-accepted definition of the term ‘refugee’ set forth in the [Convention 
and Protocol]”); S. REP. NO. 96-256, at 4, 9 (1979) (stating that the Act’s refugee definition “will 
bring United States law into conformity with our international treaty obligations” and provide 
relief “to those who qualify under the terms of the United Nations Protocol”). 
 39. See John F. Coyle, Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 655, 659 (2010) (mentioning the Refugee Act as an example of an incorporative statute). 
Professor Coyle observes that in addition to the Refugee Act, other examples of “incorporative 
statutes” may be found in conservation law, intellectual property law, arbitration law, maritime 
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The Supreme Court has, on multiple occasions, confirmed the 
derivative relationship between U.S. obligations under the Protocol 
and the Refugee Act’s asylum and withholding of removal provisions. 
In the foundational case of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court 
affirmed that it is “clear from the legislative history of the new 
definition of ‘refugee,’ and indeed the entire 1980 Act, . . . that one of 
Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law 
into conformance with the [Protocol].”40 In drawing this conclusion, 
the Court considered not only Congress’s virtually verbatim adoption 
of the Protocol’s definition of “refugee,” but also the “many 
statements indicating Congress’ intent that the new statutory 
definition of ‘refugee’ be interpreted in conformance with the 
Protocol’s definition.”41 
The BIA has also recognized Congress’s intent to conform 
domestic refugee law with U.S. obligations under the Protocol, and to 
“give ‘statutory meaning to our national commitment to human rights 
and humanitarian concerns.’”42 
3. The Domestic Refugee Law Framework.  Based on the 
Convention, the INA provides two alternative forms of relief from 
removal for noncitizens at risk of persecution: a permanent form of 
relief—asylum—or a more limited form of relief—withholding of 
removal, previously known as withholding of deportation. The 
language of the refugee definition and the withholding provision 
substantially mirrors Articles 1 and 33 of the Convention, 
respectively.43 
The Refugee Act included a new provision that gave the 
attorney general discretion to grant asylum to an individual who 
qualifies as a “refugee,”44 based on the Protocol definition.45 Asylum 
 
transport law, and criminal law. Id. at 659 & nn.12–17. To date, this class of statutes has received 
curiously limited scholarly attention within the United States. Id. at 660. 
 40. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987). 
 41. Id. at 437. 
 42. In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 492 (B.I.A. 1996) (quoting S. REP. NO. 96-256, at 1). 
 43. Notably, the Convention does not distinguish between withholding of removal and 
asylum; it enjoins states from refouling any person who satisfies the refugee definition. 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 
176. 
 44. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2006). Under the current version of the statute, the secretary of 
homeland security and the attorney general have discretion to grant asylum. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006). The 1996 amendments to the provision via the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 
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entitles a person to apply for lawful permanent resident status, which 
provides greater rights and benefits, including a pathway to eventual 
citizenship after one year of residence.46 In addition to adding the 
asylum provision, the Refugee Act also amended the withholding of 
deportation provision47 to reflect the nonrefoulement obligation 
under Article 33 of the Convention.48 It became mandatory (as 
opposed to discretionary) for the attorney general to withhold 
deportation of a person who would otherwise be sent to a country in 
which her life or freedom would be threatened on account of a 
Convention ground.49 
As a practical matter, noncitizens generally apply for asylum and 
withholding of removal simultaneously as alternative requests for 
relief.50 Noncitizens may apply for asylum affirmatively or 
defensively.51 A noncitizen files an affirmative application with the 
 
Stat. 3009, 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.), did 
not constrict the basic eligibility criteria for asylum contained in the “refugee” definition. Id. 
§ 604, 110 Stat. at 3009-690 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158). IIRIRA did, however, 
impose significant procedural obstacles on asylum applicants, including a time limit of one year 
after entry to the United States (subject to limited exceptions) on applying under INA 
§ 208(a)(2)(B) & (D), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) & (D). IIRIRA § 604, 104 Stat. at 3009-690 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158); see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 1–2 n.5 (noting 
that IIRIRA “imposes onerous procedural obstacles to asylum applicants, including a time limit 
on application of one year following entry, subject to exceptions for changed conditions or 
extraordinary circumstances”). 
 45. See INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (relying on the Protocol’s 
definition of a refugee as any person who “is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of 
the protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution”); 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 22, at 74 (“Everyone has the right to seek 
and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. . . . [However, t]his right may not be 
invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”). 
 46. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(b), 94 Stat. 102, 102-06, 105-06 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 47. The withholding of deportation provision, formerly codified as INA § 243(h), is now 
the “withholding of removal” statute at INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). 
 48. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Council Ctrs., Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 180 (1993) (noting that 
“Article 33.1 uses the words ‘expel or return (‘refouler’)’ as an obvious parallel to the words 
‘deport or return’ in § 243(h)(1)”). For further discussion regarding congressional intent to 
implement U.S. obligations under Article 33 of the Convention via the withholding of removal 
statute, see supra Part I.A.2. 
 49. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). 
 50. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.1–.4 (2010) (enumerating the rules for asylum and withholding of 
removal). 
 51. See Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the Adjudication of Immigration Cases, 
59 DUKE L.J. 1501, 1506–07 (2010) (describing the procedures associated with affirmative and 
defensive asylum applications). 
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United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a 
branch of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), if she is not 
involved in removal proceedings. A USCIS decision is subject to 
review by an immigration judge (IJ) within the Department of 
Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).52 IJ 
decisions are, in turn, subject to review by the BIA.53 A noncitizen 
who has already been placed in removal proceedings before an IJ 
may also file an asylum or withholding claim as a defense against 
removal. The IJ’s decision on a defensive application is similarly 
reviewable by the BIA.54 On rare occasions, the attorney general may 
review a BIA decision and substitute it with her opinion.55 
The BIA is an administrative body within the EOIR.56 It consists 
of fifteen members appointed by the attorney general to act as the 
attorney general’s delegates.57 Following streamlining reforms in 
2002,58 IJ decisions may be “affirmed without opinion” (AWO) by a 
single BIA member.59 A single BIA member may also provide a 
written opinion.60 A small number of cases are adjudicated by a three-
member panel when the BIA needs to reverse an IJ opinion, resolve 
inconsistencies among opinions, or establish new precedent.61 Only a 
limited number of BIA decisions rendered by a three-member panel 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3) (giving the BIA appellate jurisdiction). 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. § 1003.1(h) (providing for attorney-general review when the attorney general 
directs the BIA to refer the case and when either the chairman, the majority of the BIA, or the 
DHS secretary requests review). 
 56. See id. § 1003.1(a)(1) (detailing the organization of the BIA). 
 57. Id. 
 58. For a discussion of the deleterious implications of these reforms on the quality of BIA 
decisionmaking, see infra notes 294–98 and accompanying text. 
 59. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (“The Board member to whom a case is assigned shall 
affirm the decision of the Service or the immigration judge, without opinion, if the Board 
member determines that the result reached in the decision under review was correct; that any 
errors in the decision under review were harmless or nonmaterial; and that (A) The issues on 
appeal are squarely controlled by existing Board or federal court precedent and do not involve 
the application of precedent to a novel factual situation; or (B) The factual and legal issues 
raised on appeal are not so substantial that the case warrants the issuance of a written opinion in 
the case.”). 
 60. See id. § 1003.1(e)(5) (“If [a BIA member] . . . determines . . . that [a] decision is not 
appropriate for [AWO], [the BIA member] shall issue a brief order affirming, modifying, or 
remanding the decision under review, [or can] designate[] the case for decision by a three-
member panel . . . .”). 
 61. Id. § 1003.1(e)(6). 
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or by the board en banc are designated as precedential.62 The vast 
majority of the BIA’s decisions are unpublished,63 and its decisions 
are subject to limited judicial review by federal courts of appeals.64 
4. Treaty Interpretation Methodology Applicable to the 
Convention.  Like domestic statutes, the text of Convention 
provisions may not always lend itself to a singular, clear 
interpretation. But such ambiguity does not mean courts cannot 
authoritatively determine a provision’s meaning. Like domestic 
statutes, the meaning of terms in international treaties is derived by 
considering various interpretive sources according to established 
methodology and principles codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention).65 The Vienna 
Convention’s approach to the interpretation of treaties has been 
recognized both by U.S. courts66 and by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ)67 as embodying customary international law. A 
 
 62. See id. § 1003.1(g) (“By majority vote of the permanent Board members, selected 
decisions of the Board rendered by a three-member panel or by the Board en banc may be 
designated to serve as precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues.”). 
 63. EOIR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE 
MANUAL 9 (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/qapracmanual/apptmtn4.htm. 
 64. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006); Baum, supra note 51, at 1507 (noting that the majority of 
BIA cases heard by federal courts of appeals have involved asylum claims since the 1996 
amendments to the immigration laws foreclosed review of most other types of BIA decisions). 
 65. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. These principles are necessarily oversimplified here; a detailed discussion of 
treaty interpretation theory is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 66. Although the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, see Status of the 
United Nations Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/home.aspx (follow “Status of Treaties (MTDSG)” 
hyperlink; then follow “CHAPTER XXIII” hyperlink; then follow “Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. Vienna, 23 May 1969” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 5, 2011), U.S. courts have 
“treat[ed] the Vienna Convention as an authoritative guide to the customary international law 
of treaties.” Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 2000). See generally 
Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 
VA. J. INT’L L. 431, 434 (2004) (noting that although the Senate has not ratified the Vienna 
Convention, “many lower federal and state courts apply the convention’s treaty interpretation 
provisions routinely as customary international laws”); Maria Frankowska, The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 281, 286 
(1988) (arguing that although the United States is not party to the Vienna Convention, the 
treaty is nonetheless an informative guide because it is “a restatement of customary rules, 
binding states regardless of whether they are parties to the convention”). 
 67. See, e.g., Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Preliminary Objection, 1996 I.C.J. 803, 812 (Dec. 
12) (stating that the Vienna Convention embodies “customary international law”); IAN 
ROBERTSON SINCLAIR, VIENNA CONVENTION AND THE LAW OF TREATIES 153 (1984) (“There 
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fundamental principle of treaty interpretation, frequently overlooked 
by U.S. judges,68 is that treaty language has “no ‘ordinary meaning’ in 
the absolute or abstract.”69 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention 
underscores that the “ordinary meaning” of a treaty provision is 
determined in context, and in light of the treaty’s object and 
purpose.70 
A key source for determining the object and purpose of a treaty 
is its preamble.71 In the case of the Convention, the first two 
paragraphs of the preamble underscore the rights-protective purpose 
of the treaty,72 referencing the United Nations’ concern that refugees 
enjoy the widest possible exercise of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms guaranteed to all people.73 A second interpretive source is 
 
is no doubt that Articles 31 to 33 of the [Vienna] Convention constitute a general expression of 
the principles of customary international law relating to treaty interpretation.”). 
 68. Cf. Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Although in interpreting 
a treaty we begin with the text, we may look beyond the written words to other factors for 
interpretive guidance. Appropriate sources to consult include the purposes of the treaty, its 
drafting history, and its post-ratification understanding.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). For further discussion, see infra Part I.B.2. 
 69. Land, Island & Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), 1992 
I.C.J. 351, 719 (Sept. 11) (separate opinion of Bernárdez, J.) (“[D]ue account [must] be taken 
of . . . various interpretive principles and elements, and not only of [the] words or expressions 
used in the interpreted provision[s] taken in isolation.”). 
 70. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 65, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340 (“A 
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”). Despite this 
most basic rule of treaty interpretation, “literalism continues to have real appeal, particularly to 
governments and courts anxious to simplify their own task, or to be seen to be making ‘more 
objective’ decisions.” JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (2005). 
 71. The International Court of Justice regards the preamble to a treaty as “a principle and 
natural source from which indications can be gathered of a treaty’s objects and purposes.” 
Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinnea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53, 142 (Nov. 12) 
(Weeramantry, J., dissenting); see also Rights of Nationals of United States of America in 
Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176, 196 (Aug. 27) (relying on the preamble to interpret the 
object and purpose of a treaty); Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 282 (Nov. 20) (same). 
 72. In Matter of S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486 (B.I.A. 1996), the BIA recognized “the 
fundamental humanitarian concerns of asylum law.” Id. at 492. The BIA held that in enacting 
the Refugee Act, “Congress sought to bring the Act’s definition of ‘refugee’ into conformity 
with the [Protocol] and, in so doing, give ‘statutory meaning to our national commitment to 
human rights and humanitarian concerns.’” Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 96-256, at 4 (1979)). This 
“approach is designed to afford a generous standard for protection in cases of doubt.” Id.; cf. 
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 183 (1993) (considering the “humanitarian 
intent” of the Convention irrelevant to the construction of its provisions). 
 73. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6259, 189 
U.N.T.S. at 150–52. 
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the historical record of the treaty’s drafting, or travaux préparatoires,74 
which, in the case of the Convention, was carefully defined, approved 
by states, and published.75 Statements by several of the Convention’s 
drafters, including the U.S. delegate, indicate an expectation that the 
nonrefoulement obligation would be interpreted broadly and that its 
exceptions would be limited and construed narrowly.76 This 
interpretation is also consistent with the general principle that 
exceptions to international human rights treaties must be interpreted 
narrowly.77 
Other sources of treaty interpretation include the interpretation 
of the treaty by other states parties,78 the work of scholars on the 
treaty,79 and, in the case of the Convention, the views of the 
UNHCR.80 Although the UNHCR is not a centralized status-
 
 74. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 65, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340. The 
ICJ has relied on the travaux préparatoires to fill textual voids. See, e.g., Reservations to 
Convention on Prevention of Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 21 (May 28) 
(taking into account the treaty’s drafting history in construing its meaning). The ICJ has also 
relied on the travaux préparatoires to interpret treaty terms as a matter of first impression. See, 
e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility, Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 392, 406 (Nov. 26). 
 75. HATHAWAY, supra note 70, at 56. 
 76. For example, “[T]he United Kingdom delegate stated that ‘the authors of [Article 
33(2)] had sought to restrict its scope so as not to prejudice the efficiency of the article as a 
whole.’” Case Law, Factum of the Intervenor United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(“UNHCR”) Suresh v. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration; The Attorney General of 
Canada S.C.C. No. 27790 in the Supreme Court of Canada (On Appeal from the Federal Court of 
Appeal), 14 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 141, 153 (2002). He noted that “[t]he power to expel [a 
refugee] would not, of course, be employed if it would endanger his life.” Id. (first alteration in 
original). Similarly, the U.S. delegate stated that “it would be highly undesirable to suggest in 
the text of [Article 33] that there might be cases, even highly exceptional cases, where a man 
might be sent to death or persecution.” Id. (alteration in original). 
 77. See, e.g., Klass v. Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 42 (1978) (“[A]n exception to a 
right guaranteed by the [European Convention on Human Rights] is to be narrowly 
interpreted.”). 
 78. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 65, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 330. But see 
HATHAWAY, supra note 70, at 73 (“[T]he Vienna Convention does not require deference to all 
state practice, but only to such practice as derives from a sense of legal obligation, rather than—
as is most common in the human rights context—from state self-interest or expediency.”). 
 79. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 
1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1187; see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(holding that “[t]he law of nations ‘may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing 
professedly on public law’” (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 
(1820))). 
 80. The UNHCR is the U.N. agency mandated to provide international protection to 
refugees and, in particular, to supervise the application of treaties relating to refugees. 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. at 
150; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. at 
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determination body, it promotes uniformity in state practice by 
issuing guidelines and opinions, including the seminal Handbook on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Handbook).81 
In the United States, the UNHCR does not play a formal adjudicative 
or administrative role; however, it files amicus briefs and advisory 
opinions with U.S. courts on matters of international refugee law and 
Convention interpretation.82 The Supreme Court has noted that 
although nonbinding, the UNHCR Handbook “provides significant 
guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought to 
conform”83 and that “[i]t has been widely considered useful in giving 
content to the obligations that the Protocol establishes.”84 The BIA 
has similarly referenced the Handbook on numerous occasions when 
interpreting Convention provisions,85 and the Handbook is cited 
 
267. The Convention and Protocol explicitly require the commitment of states parties to 
cooperate with the UNHCR in the exercise of its functions and to facilitate the UNHCR’s duty 
to supervise the application of the Convention. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
supra note 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. at 150; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
supra note 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. at 267. 
 81. OFFICE OF THE UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR 
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL 
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES (1992); see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 13 n.79 
(observing that “[t]he United States was among the states requesting the UNHCR to draft” the 
Handbook). 
 82. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 12 (“[T]he formal role of the UNHCR in the 
application of refugee law in the United States is rather marginal.”). 
 83. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987); see also M.A. A26851062 v. 
INS, 858 F.2d 210, 214–15 n.3 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that “[w]e assume that Congress was 
aware of the criteria articulated in the Handbook when it passed the [Refugee] Act in 1980, and 
that it is appropriate to consider the guidelines in the Handbook as an aid to construction of the 
Act” (citing U.S. Refugee Program: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, 
Refugees, and International Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 24, 26 (1981) 
(memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, 
to David Crossland, General Counsel, INS))). 
 84. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 439 n.22. 
 85. See In re T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 172 n.9, 172–73 (B.I.A. 2007) (using the Handbook 
definition of persecution in defining the requisite level of economic harm to constitute 
persecution); In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1334 (B.I.A. 2000) (citing the Handbook for the 
overarching principle of “the fundamental humanitarian concerns of asylum law”); In re N-M-
A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312, 324 (B.I.A. 1998) (using the Handbook to define the well-founded fear 
of persecution in the context of regime change, and establishing an exception to the cessation 
provision under 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(ii) (1998) which “mirror[ed] the language of Article 
1C(5) of the 1951 Convention”); In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 725 (B.I.A. 1997) 
(referencing the Handbook to interpret the context of an asylum applicant’s statements, and 
establishing what benefit the BIA should accord to an applicant’s statements); see also In re Y-
B-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1136, 1141 n.2 (B.I.A. 1998) (citing the Handbook as a guideline for how 
much information an adjudicator may require of an asylum applicant to confirm the factual 
aspects of a claim); In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 347 (B.I.A. 1996) (referencing the Handbook 
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throughout EOIR’s Asylum Officer Basic Training Course 
materials.86 But courts have also occasionally relied on the Supreme 
Court’s observation that the Handbook is nonbinding to diminish its 
significance.87 Beyond the Handbook, U.S. courts have displayed no 
coherency in their use of UNHCR views published elsewhere, relying 
on its advisory opinions or amicus briefs as an aid to treaty 
interpretation in some cases88 and simply ignoring its views in others.89 
The courts of other countries have confirmed that later UNHCR 
sources, such as the Conclusions of its Executive Committee, are “of 
considerable persuasive authority.”90 Some scholars argue that despite 
the dismissive attitude of U.S. courts, they have a legal obligation 
 
as support for the assertion that “central to a discretionary finding in past persecution cases 
should be careful attention to compelling, humanitarian considerations that would be involved if 
the refugee were to be forced to return to a country where he or she was persecuted in the 
past”); In re R-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 621, 625–26 (B.I.A. 1992) (looking to the Handbook as evidence 
that a well-founded fear of persecution usually must exist on a countrywide basis); In re Chen, 
20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 19 (B.I.A. 1989) (citing the Handbook’s reference to a “general 
humanitarian principle” as evidence that victims of past persecution should in some cases be 
treated as refugees even when future persecution is not likely); In re Fefe, 20 I. & N. Dec. 116, 
118 (B.I.A. 1989) (referencing the Handbook’s guideline that, to demonstrate eligibility for 
asylum, an applicant usually must corroborate prior written statements with personal 
testimony); In re Dass, 20 I. & N. Dec. 120, 125 (B.I.A. 1989) (pointing to the Handbook’s 
requirement that an asylum applicant’s statements must be supported by relevant background 
information). 
 86. See, e.g., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC 
TRAINING COURSE, SOURCES OF AUTHORITY (2007), available at http://www.uscis.gov/
files/article/AOBTC_Lesson_3_Sources_of_Authority.pdf. The course’s “Introduction to the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Concepts of International 
Protection” Lesson (Mar. 1, 2005), available at http://www.rmscdenver.org/aobtc/UNHCR
ConceptsofIntlProtection.pdf, however, betrays the importance the USCIS attributes to 
international law, noting that “training on this lesson in [the Asylum Officer Basic Training 
Course] will be minimal and the contents of the lesson will not be tested.” Id. 
 87. See infra notes 180–81 and accompanying text. 
 88. See, e.g., Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 203 n.30 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing UNHCR 
sources’ interpretation of the term “danger” in Article 33.2 of the Protocol). 
 89. For example, in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993), the majority 
flatly ignored the UNHCR’s explanation of the language of Article 33 in its amicus brief, 
choosing instead to tortuously imply the opposite meaning—that the Protocol was not intended 
to govern parties’ conduct outside of their national borders—into the UNHCR Handbook, 
which was silent on the question of the Protocol’s extraterritorial application. Id. at 182 n.40; see 
also Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 14 (“While the UNHCR occasionally seeks to offer an 
authoritative interpretation of the Protocol as amicus curiae in major asylum cases, the courts 
have adopted no consistent response to the UNHCR’s participation.”). But cf. Sale, 509 U.S. at 
197 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The majority neglects to point out that the current High 
Commissioner for Refugees acknowledges that the Convention does apply extraterritorially.”). 
 90. N.Z. Refugee Status Appeals Auth., Refugee Appeal No. 1/92 Re SA, UNITED 
NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (Apr. 30, 1992), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/3ae6b73d8.html. 
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under the Protocol to take those sources into account because, 
although not legally binding, they are considered authoritative and 
may not be dismissed by domestic courts without justification.91 
Accordingly, just as numerous statutory interpretative canons 
exist to guide U.S. courts through the complexities and ambiguities of 
the U.S. Code, there are a set of interpretive principles and sources 
available to U.S. courts to determine the content of U.S. obligations 
under international law and the meaning of international treaty 
terms. Given the binding nature of U.S. refugee treaty obligations 
and the availability of these interpretive tools, there appears to be 
little justification for courts’ tendency to disregard international 
refugee law based on the apparent ambiguity of treaty language.92 
B. According Deference to BIA Interpretations Regardless of 
Inconsistency with the Convention 
1. The Chevron Doctrine.  For almost a quarter century, federal 
courts have reviewed administrative agency decisions in light of the 
deference principles established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.93 The Supreme Court has held that 
the Chevron deference framework applies to the BIA’s interpretation 
of asylum provisions of the INA.94 Chevron has been the source of a 
vast body of scholarship95 and has been described as “the Court’s 
most important decision about the most important issue in modern 
 
 91. For example, Professor Walter Kälin argues that  
as part of States Parties’ duty to cooperate with UNHCR and to accept its supervisory 
role under Article 35 of the 1951 Convention and article II of the 1967 Protocol, they 
have to take into account Executive Committee Conclusions, the UNHCR 
Handbook, UNHCR guidelines, and other UNHCR positions on matters of law (for 
example amicus curiae and similar submissions to courts . . .), when applying the 1951 
Convention and its Protocol. 
Walter Kälin, Supervising the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Article 35 and 
Beyond, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL 
CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 613, 627 (Erika Feller, Volker Türk & 
Frances Nicholson eds., 2003). 
 92. For a discussion of this trend and how it may be addressed, see infra Parts I.B.2. and 
V.B.1., respectively. 
 93. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 94. See Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1164–65 (2009) (“[T]he BIA should be accorded 
Chevron deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms ‘concrete meaning through a process 
of case-by-case adjudication.’” (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999))); see 
also infra Part II.B–C. 
 95. See Note, The Two Faces of Chevron, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1562, 1562 (2007) (asserting 
that Chevron “has generated a substantial body of legal scholarship”—6,094 citations in law 
review articles by the author’s count). 
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administrative law.”96 The subject of much of that scholarship is 
beyond the scope of the present Article, which will focus specifically 
on the (mis)application of Chevron’s basic rationales and principles in 
the refugee context. 
In Chevron, the Court considered what, if any, deference a 
reviewing court owes to an administrative agency’s interpretation of a 
statute that it administers.97 The Chevron Court directed lower courts 
to employ a two-step approach in reviewing agency interpretations of 
acts of Congress to determine whether deference is owed.98 First, 
courts must “employ[] traditional tools of statutory construction” to 
determine whether Congress expressed a clear intent as to the 
meaning of a statutory term.99 When Congress has expressed itself 
clearly, “The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory 
construction and must reject administrative constructions which are 
contrary to clear congressional intent.”100 However, “if the statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the reviewing 
court proceeds to the second step, in which “the question for the 
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”101 
The second step was based on the Court’s controversial theory102 
that Congress implicitly delegated to administrative agencies the 
authority to interpret any gaps in statutes that they administer 
relatively free from judicial interference.103 The Court further justified 
 
 96. Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-
Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 809 (2002). 
 97. Specifically, the Court considered whether to defer to the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (EPA) interpretation of the undefined term “stationary source,” which described the 
category of industrial plants that were subject to environmental restrictions under the Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 2007, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 309, 91 Stat. 685, 781 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 7619 (2006)). The EPA had promulgated a regulation interpreting the term in a 
manner that would limit the kinds of plants that were subject to environmental restrictions. See 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. The Court held that the EPA’s narrow interpretation was entitled to 
deference, id. at 865, overruling the Ninth Circuit’s decision to substitute the EPA’s 
interpretation with one more consistent with the statute’s perceived environmental purpose, id. 
at 841–42. 
 98. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 99. Id. at 843 n.9. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 843. 
 102. See, e.g., Kane, supra note 6, at 535 (“[T]he [Chevron] Court created a fiction of 
implied Congressional delegation.”). 
 103. See id. (“The Chevron Court inferred this implicit delegation from the fact that 
Congress authorizes agencies in certain circumstances to make legally binding pronouncements 
through rulemaking or adjudication.”). More recently, the Court has cited the implied 
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deference based on the agency’s particular expertise in a complex 
regulatory scheme, the lack of judicial expertise in the field, and the 
detailed fashion in which the agency had considered the issue in that 
case.104 Additionally, the Court considered deference appropriate 
because, unlike courts, administrative agencies are politically 
accountable.105 This attribute, the Court reasoned, was significant 
when agency decisions involve balancing conflicting policy interests, 
such as the considerations of economic growth versus environmental 
objectives that were implicated in the statute under consideration in 
Chevron.106 
2. Deference to Unmoored BIA Interpretations—The 
“Particularly Serious Crime” Example.  Throughout the life of the 
Refugee Act, federal courts have routinely deferred under the 
Chevron doctrine to the BIA’s interpretation of INA refugee 
provisions.107 They have done so despite the fact that the BIA’s 
interpretations are rarely derived from or reconciled with analyses of 
corresponding Convention provisions under international law, and as 
a result, sometimes conflict with them. To the extent that courts 
consider the Convention at all, they generally either interpret 
Chevron to mean that BIA interpretations trump interpretations of 
Convention provisions under international law, or they find that when 
 
delegation theory as the primary reason for according deference to statutory interpretation by 
an administrative agency. See Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1167 (2009) (“[A]mbiguities in 
statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency 
to fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion.” (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005))). 
 104. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863, 865. 
 105. Id. at 864–66. The Court acknowledged that agencies are not directly accountable to 
the people, but found it sufficient that the chief executive is accountable. Id. at 865. 
 106. Id. at 863. 
 107. Kane, supra note 6, at 516 (“Our courts too often misread the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Chevron as tying the Judiciary’s hands in refugee protection cases.”). Routine 
deference to the BIA is not unique to refugee cases. Federal courts have been criticized for 
excessive deference to the BIA’s interpretation of immigration provisions across the board. See, 
e.g., Maureen B. Callahan, Judicial Review of Agency Legal Determinations in Asylum Cases, 28 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 773, 775 (1992) (asserting that in immigration cases, courts frequently 
apply “an unduly deferential standard of review to agency legal determinations”); Brian G. 
Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 530 
(2003) (“In immigration cases, . . . many claim that the Court is too deferential to interpretations 
made by the Attorney General.”). Excessive deference is also common in appellate court review 
of the BIA’s application of law to facts. See, e.g., Mejilla-Romero v. Holder, 600 F.3d 63, 92 (1st 
Cir. 2010) (Stahl, J., dissenting) (“In my view, this court has allowed the standard of review in 
asylum cases to become an ever more impermeable barrier to any meaningful appellate 
review.”). 
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the meaning of a Convention provision is not clear on its face, then 
congressional intent is ambiguous and the BIA’s “reasonable” 
construction deserves deference. 
An emblematic example of this problem is the widespread 
deference federal courts have given to the BIA’s interpretation of the 
bar on eligibility for withholding of removal for individuals who pose 
a danger to the community. Section 241(b)(3)(B)(ii) of the INA 
provides that a person is ineligible for withholding of removal if she, 
“having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious 
crime[,] is a danger to the community of the United States.”108 This 
bar, enacted via the Refugee Act, implements one of the two 
exceptions to protection against refoulement under Article 33(2) of 
the Convention109 and directly mirrors the language of Article 33(2).110 
There is relative consensus among the UNHCR,111 leading refugee 
law scholars,112 and the courts of other countries such as Canada113 and 
 
 108. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 109. The first version of the provision was codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988). There have 
been three subsequent amendments to the definition of a “particularly serious crime” beyond 
the Convention definition. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 305(3), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-602 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006)) (establishing the statute’s current form, which categorically 
bars aggravated felons sentenced to five years or more of imprisonment); Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 413(f), 110 Stat. 1214, 
1269 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)) (relaxing the categorical bar to comply with 
U.S. obligations under the Protocol); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 515, 104 
Stat. 4978, 5053 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158) (establishing a categorical bar to 
withholding of removal for individuals convicted of an aggravated felony). For a further 
discussion of AEDPA and its modifications to comply with the Protocol, see Delgado v. Holder, 
563 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 110. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 
U.N.T.S. at 176. 
 111. See UNHCR, GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION: APPLICATION OF THE 
EXCLUSION CLAUSES: ARTICLE 1F OF THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF 
REFUGEES ¶¶ 2, 4 (2003) (“[Article] 33(2) . . . deal[s] . . . [with] the withdrawal of protection 
from refoulement from . . . recognised refugees who pose a danger to the host State (for 
example, because of serious crimes they have committed there).”). 
 112. See, e.g., ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
234 (1966) (emphasizing that Article 33(2) “can clearly not refer to a past danger, but only to a 
present or future danger”); LAUTERPACHT & BETHLEHEM, supra note 30, ¶ 147, at 129 
(indicating that the exception “hinges on an appreciation of a future threat from the person 
concerned rather than on the commission of some act in the past”). 
 113. Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, 
para. 12 (Can.) (finding that a government must “make the added determination that the person 
poses a danger to the safety of the public or to the security of the country . . . to justify 
refoulement”). 
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the United Kingdom114 that Article 33(2) requires two distinct 
determinations: first, a finding that the person seeking refugee 
protection has been convicted by a final judgment of a “particularly 
serious crime” and, second, a subsequent individualized, prospective 
assessment of whether the refugee constitutes a future danger to the 
community.115 Although the BIA’s early interpretation of the danger-
to-the-community bar required a separate determination of 
dangerousness,116 the BIA has held since its 1986 decision in Matter of 
Carballe117 that the individualized assessment of actual dangerousness 
is not necessary.118 Thus, according to the BIA, a person may be 
refouled on the basis of a previous offense alone, even if the 
individual poses no current or future threat to community safety.119 
The BIA’s single-paragraph statutory interpretation in Matter of 
Carballe makes no mention of the Convention.120 
Courts of appeals in seven circuits121 have, applying the Chevron 
doctrine, deferred to the BIA’s interpretation in Matter of Carballe 
 
 114. R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2006] EWHC 3513 (Eng. Q.B.) (noting the 
policy that the government must consider whether a noncitizen has been convicted of a 
particularly serious crime and whether that noncitizen poses a danger to the community). 
 115. See supra notes 111–14. 
 116. See In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (B.I.A. 1982) (“In judging the seriousness 
of a crime, we look to such factors as . . . whether the type and circumstances of the crime 
indicate that the alien will be a danger to the community.”), superseded by statute on other 
grounds, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1990), as recognized in Afridi v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 1212, 1220 n.4 
(9th Cir. 2006). 
 117. In re Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1986). 
 118. Id. at 360 (“[A]liens who have been finally convicted of particularly serious crimes are 
presumptively dangers to this country’s community.”). 
 119. See, e.g., id. (“The phrase ‘danger to the community’ is an aid to defining a ‘particularly 
serious crime,’ not a mandate that administrative agencies or the courts determine whether an 
alien will become a recidivist.”). 
 120. Id. The paragraph follows a description of two arguments advanced by the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service in favor of its construction, namely the absence of the word “and” 
between the two parts of the provision (omitting the fact that Article 33(2) is identically 
worded) and the fact that the House Judiciary Committee Report notes that the exception is 
intended for “aliens . . . who have been convicted of particularly serious crimes which make 
them a danger to the community.” Id. at 359–60 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 17 (1979)). 
The BIA did not consider any other aspect of the Refugee Act’s legislative history, including 
Congress’s intent to implement the Protocol. 
 121. The Second Circuit noted in Ahmetovic v. INS, 62 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 1995), that this 
“interpretation conflating the two requirements has been accepted by every circuit that has 
considered the issue.” Id. at 53 (collecting cases); see also Yousefi v. INS, 260 F.3d 318, 327–28 
(4th Cir. 2001) (deferring to the BIA’s construction of § 1231); Choeum v. INS, 129 F.3d 29, 42–
43 (1st Cir. 1997) (same); Hamama v. INS, 78 F.3d 233, 240 (6th Cir. 1996) (same); Al-Salehi v. 
INS, 47 F.3d 390, 393 (10th Cir. 1995) (same); Garcia v. INS, 7 F.3d 1320, 1323 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(same); Martins v. INS, 972 F.2d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 1992) (same). 
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and subsequent cases.122 For example, in Choeum v. INS,123 the 
petitioner argued before the First Circuit that Congress intended the 
provision to comply with U.S. obligations under the Protocol, which, 
according to an opinion by the UNHCR Representative, requires a 
separate dangerousness determination.124 Applying Chevron, the 
court dismissed the petitioner’s arguments, holding that “where the 
statute is ambiguous, and the BIA has offered a reasonable 
interpretation of its provisions, it would be improper for this court to 
substitute the advisory opinion of an international body for the 
reasoned judgment of the domestic administrative agency with 
primary responsibility for administering the statute.”125 In a similar 
case, the Second Circuit admitted it was troubled by the BIA’s failure 
to give separate consideration to petitioner’s actual dangerousness 
based on the plain language of the statute.126 It deferred to the BIA, 
however, on the basis of the ambiguity of the statutory language and 
its understanding that Chevron prohibited it from substituting its own 
construction for that of an administrative agency.127 The court 
cursorily dismissed the petitioner’s “arguments concerning 
international treaty law” as without merit.128 
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit was willing to consider the views 
of international law scholars on Article 33(2) but found that the 
“uncertainty” as to a resolved consensus position under international 
law warranted deference to the BIA.129 The Sixth Circuit also 
recognized the “particularly serious crime” exception as the 
codification of U.S. obligations under the Protocol, but similarly 
found that because neither the Protocol nor the UNHCR Handbook 
 
 122. Subsequent BIA decisions have addressed later versions of the bar enacted through the 
AEDPA and IIRIRA amendments described in note 109, supra. 
 123. Choeum v. INS, 129 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 1997). Choeum concerned the BIA’s decision in 
Matter of Q-T-M-T-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 639 (B.I.A. 1996), which held that § 413(f) did not require a 
separate dangerousness requirement, despite the fact that the provision explicitly referenced the 
Protocol. Id. at 645–47. 
 124. Choeum, 129 F.3d at 42. 
 125. Id. at 43. 
 126. Ahmetovic, 62 F.3d at 52. 
 127. Id. at 53. The court also based its decision on the unanimity of other circuits and “the 
seeming intent of Congress,” which it derived solely from the single sentence in the House 
Judiciary Committee Report that the BIA cited in Matter of Carballe. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 
96-608, at 18 (1979)); see also supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 128. Ahmetovic, 62 F.3d at 53. 
 129. Garcia v. INS, 7 F.3d 1320, 1325–26 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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defines the term, Congress did not express clear intent as to its 
meaning.130 
In the most recent case to consider the provision, N-A-M v. 
Holder,131 the UNHCR and three leading refugee law scholars filed 
amicus curiae briefs in the Tenth Circuit, drawing the court’s 
attention to the widely accepted interpretation of Article 33(2) that 
conflicts with the BIA’s construction.132 The court held that amici’s 
arguments came too late in the day: “Although N-A-M and the 
distinguished amici make strong arguments that the BIA is not 
accurately interpreting the statute and its treaty-based underpinnings, 
we are constrained by our precedent to hold otherwise.”133 With this 
decision, the court upheld its earlier decision in Al-Salehi v. INS,134 
which accorded deference under Chevron to Matter of Carballe on the 
basis of the statute’s “uncertain” language.135 Notably, the Al-Salehi 
court did not dispute the petitioner’s argument that legislative intent 
to abrogate or modify a treaty must be clearly expressed.136 It deferred 
to the BIA’s interpretation, however, because it found the language 
of Article 33(2) equally ambiguous, and the petitioner did not cite any 
international authority to dispel this ambiguity.137 
In each case, the circuit court deferred to the BIA’s construction 
of the statute despite its inconsistency with at least one interpretive 
source for the Convention (or in some cases, multiple interpretive 
sources). The various reasons given—the BIA trumps UNHCR;138 
international law is irrelevant;139 the lack of treaty interpretation 
consensus warrants BIA deference;140 ambiguity in the treaty’s plain 
language equals ambiguity in congressional intent;141 the asylum 
seeker bears the burden of clarifying ambiguity in treaty142—reflect a 
lack of any systematic approach toward the treaty, as well as a 
 
 130. Hamama v. INS, 78 F.3d 233, 239 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 131. N-A-M v. Holder, 587 F.3d 1052 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 132. Deborah Anker, Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, and James C. Hathaway filed a joint brief as 
amicus curiae. Id. at 1053. 
 133. Id. at 1057. 
 134. Al-Salehi v. INS, 47 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 135. Id. at 393–94. 
 136. Id. at 395. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See supra text accompanying notes 123–25. 
 139. See supra text accompanying notes 126–28. 
 140. See supra text accompanying notes 129–30. 
 141. See supra text accompanying note 130. 
 142. See supra cases cited notes 131–37. 
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fundamental discomfort with the task of interpreting it. Under the 
hazy cover of Chevron, each court sidestepped the task of 
meaningfully reconciling the BIA’s construction with congressional 
intent that the statute comport with U.S. obligations under Article 33. 
II.  SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON CHEVRON AND  
THE CONVENTION 
The Supreme Court has addressed the construction of the 
Refugee Act on very few occasions, especially compared with the 
almost fifty thousand asylum claims immigration courts receive each 
year.143 It has directly interpreted the asylum provisions using the 
Chevron framework in three key cases: INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca in 
1987, INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre in 1999, and Negusie v. Holder in 2009. 
These cases demonstrate the Court’s lack of a coherent approach to 
the role of the Convention in establishing the construction of 
domestic asylum provisions or of any consistent methodology for 
interpreting the treaty’s terms. On the one hand, the absence of a 
well-defined or sophisticated approach to the interpretation of 
international refugee law is troubling, particularly to the extent it 
represents a broader antipathy toward international and foreign law. 
But the incoherence also presents an opportunity, leaving open the 
possibility that the Court could establish a line of jurisprudence that 
reflects a proper commitment to compliance with international law. 
A. Cardoza-Fonseca: Defining a Path 
In Cardoza-Fonseca, Justice Stevens wrote one of the Court’s 
most significant opinions supporting a limited reading of Chevron, 
which he had authored three years earlier.144 Cardoza-Fonseca 
concerned the evidentiary standard for a “well founded fear of 
persecution” that applicants must demonstrate to be eligible for 
asylum under INA § 208(a).145 It came three years after the Court’s 
 
 143. In 2008, immigration courts received 47,459 asylum claims (affirmative and defensive); 
they received over 55,000 claims in 2006 and in 2007. EOIR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2008 
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, at I1 (2009), available at http://pards.org/eoir/EOIR_2008_
Statistical_Year_Book_(March_2009)_(PDF_-_483KB).pdf. 
 144. As one of the Court’s first opportunities to grapple with the application of Chevron 
beyond the EPA, Cardoza-Fonseca was a landmark decision both within and outside the 
immigration context. 
 145. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987). 
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much-criticized decision in INS v. Stevic,146 in which the Court had 
established a heightened evidentiary standard for withholding of 
removal based on pre-1986 jurisprudence, rather than on the new 
“well-founded fear of persecution” standard in the Protocol.147 In 
Cardoza-Fonseca, the government argued that the asylum evidentiary 
standard should conform with the more stringent “clear probability of 
persecution” standard that the Stevic Court established for 
withholding of removal.148 The majority in Cardoza-Fonseca rejected 
the government’s position, instead embracing the Convention-based 
approach advanced by the petitioner, UNHCR, and other amici, 
which only required that an applicant demonstrate a “well founded 
fear of persecution.”149 The Court declined to defer under Chevron to 
the BIA’s inconsistent construction.150 
Cardoza-Fonseca limited Chevron in three significant ways. First, 
it cabined (somewhat artificially151) the applicability of deference 
requirements to those BIA decisions that fill statutory gaps as distinct 
from those that address pure issues of statutory construction. The 
majority rejected the immigration agency’s request for heightened 
deference on the basis that “[t]he question whether Congress 
intended the [asylum and withholding] standards to be identical is a 
pure question of statutory construction for the courts to decide.”152 It 
distinguished these types of statutory construction questions from the 
“process of case-by-case adjudication”153 through which an agency 
 
 146. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984). For a critique of Stevic, see, for example, Fitzpatrick, 
supra note 6, at 9, which notes Stevic’s “corrosive effect.” 
 147. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 429–30. Ironically, in Stevic, the government argued that the asylum 
and withholding of removal standards could be different (and that the withholding standard 
need not be as generous as the asylum standard). Id. at 413–14. 
 148. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430. In Stevic, decided pre-Chevron, the Court addressed 
the standard for withholding of deportation under INA § 243(h). Stevic, 467 U.S. at 409. Stevic 
(and numerous amici curiae, including the UNHCR) argued that the standard ought to turn on 
the definition of “refugee” under the Protocol, which governs Article 33’s prohibition against 
refoulement to which the domestic withholding statute corresponds. Id. at 413–14. Although the 
practical import of the distinction between a “well founded fear of persecution” and a “clear 
probability of persecution” is minor, the Court’s refusal to adopt the treaty standard placed U.S. 
jurisprudence at odds with international refugee law, and it remains so to this day. See 
Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 8–9. 
 149. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449. 
 150. Id. at 445–46. 
 151. The malleability of this distinction is borne out by its subsequent application in 
Aguirre-Aguirre and Negusie. See infra notes 221–25 and accompanying text. 
 152. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446. 
 153. Id. at 448. 
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applies a standard to particular facts, filling “any gap left, implicitly or 
explicitly, by Congress.”154 If an issue can be defined as a question of 
statutory construction, “the judiciary is the final authority . . . and 
must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear 
congressional intent.”155 The majority distinguished Chevron because 
it involved an agency’s complex policy judgment about how to fill a 
statutory gap, not a pure question of statutory construction.156 
The second significant aspect of the Court’s opinion in Cardoza-
Fonseca is its use of treaty interpretation principles to determine the 
meaning of undefined Convention language. Specifically, the Court 
discerned the relevant standards under the Convention by consulting 
statements of the drafters of the provision, the documents adopting 
it,157 and the views of “scholars who have studied the matter.”158 It 
relied on the UNHCR Handbook, recognizing it as an important 
guide in defining U.S. obligations under the Protocol.159 Significantly, 
the Court described its interpretive methodology and use of the 
Protocol as an “ordinary canon[] of statutory construction.”160 Justice 
Blackmun wrote a short concurrence in which he proclaimed that the 
Court had not only construed the asylum statute in light of the 
Protocol but had also ruled on the appropriate interpretive sources 
and methodology that the BIA should apply.161 He emphasized the 
Protocol’s “rich history of interpretation in international law and 
 
 154. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984)). 
 155. Id. at 447–48 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9). 
 156. See id. at 445 & n.29, 446–48 (quoting extensively from Chevron); see also Negusie v. 
Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1172 n.4 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(discussing the Court’s clear rejection of Justice Scalia’s position in Cardoza-Fonseca). 
 157. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 438 (citing the United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, 
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, 39, U.N. Doc. E/1618, 
E/AC.32/5 (Feb. 17, 1950)). 
 158. Id. at 439–40, 440 n.24 (citing GUY GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 22–24 (1983); GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 112, at 181). 
 159. Id. at 438–39 (citing OFFICE OF THE UNHCR, supra note 81). The Court found that 
“the Handbook provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress 
sought to conform,” and observed that “[i]t has been widely considered useful in giving content 
to the obligations that the Protocol establishes.” Id. at 439 n.22 (citing use of the Handbook by 
lower courts and the BIA). The Court cautioned, however, that the Handbook does not have 
independent force of law or bind the executive. Id. 
 160. Id. at 449. The Court found the interpretation of the Protocol—along with the plain 
language and legislative history of the Refugee Act—“compelling, even without regard to the 
longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of 
the alien.” Id. 
 161. Id. at 450–52 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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scholarly commentaries” that “should be significant in the agency’s 
formulation” of the relevant standard alongside any relevant 
domestic sources.162 Lower courts should be applying the same canons 
of statutory construction identified in Cardoza-Fonseca when 
interpreting statutes that incorporate international treaties. As the 
cases discussed in the previous Part demonstrate, however, lower 
courts have rarely used Cardoza-Fonseca as a methodological guide.163 
Finally, the Court gave lower courts license to look to the 
legislative history of the Refugee Act to determine whether Congress 
expressed an intention about the statute’s meaning that was contrary 
to its plain language.164 In determining congressional intent, the Court 
considered “particularly compelling . . . the abundant evidence of an 
intent to conform the definition of ‘refugee’ and our asylum law to 
the United Nations Protocol”165 and concluded that “[i]t is thus 
appropriate to consider what the phrase ‘well-founded fear’ means 
with relation to the Protocol.”166 This largely overlooked aspect of the 
majority opinion arguably provides support for lower courts to 
resolve, under the first step of Chevron, any “pure question[s] of 
statutory construction”167 concerning a Refugee Act provision in 
conformity with clear congressional intent to comply with the 
Convention.168 
Although the Court’s decisions since Cardoza-Fonseca have 
blurred Chevron’s limitations and diluted the significance of the 
Convention, the key principles established in Cardoza-Fonseca 
 
 162. Id. at 451. 
 163. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 164. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 432 n.12 (stating that even if the language of a statute 
appears clear on its face, courts should nevertheless look to the statute’s legislative history to 
determine whether there is “‘clearly expressed legislative intention’ contrary to that language, 
which would require us to question the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent 
through the language it chooses” (quoting United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986))). 
 165. Id. at 432; see also id. at 436 (“[It] is clear from the legislative history of . . . the entire 
1980 Act . . . that one of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into 
conformance with the [Protocol].”); id. at 437 (“The Conference Committee Report, for 
example, stated that the definition was accepted ‘with the understanding that it is based directly 
upon the language of the Protocol and it is intended that the provision be construed consistent 
with the Protocol.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 96-590, at 20 (1980))). 
 166. Id. at 437. 
 167. Id. at 446. 
 168. Despite the significance attributed to the Protocol, it was not the first interpretive 
source that the Court considered—it first examined the plain language of the statute, id. at 430–
31, and then the history of a prior asylum-related provision, id. at 433–36. The Court also 
examined a prior version of the Refugee Act that Congress did not adopt. Id. at 441–43. 
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remain instructive for lower courts. Indeed, in its subsequent 
decisions in Aguirre-Aguirre and Negusie, the Court made deliberate 
efforts to indicate the consistency of those opinions with Cardoza-
Fonseca by distinguishing it in some respect. 
B. Aguirre-Aguirre: A Mixed Methodology Message 
In Aguirre-Aguirre, a unanimous Supreme Court significantly 
retreated from Cardoza-Fonseca’s engagement with the Convention. 
It deferred to the BIA’s questionable construction of an exception to 
eligibility for withholding of removal, reiterating that Chevron applies 
to decisions of the attorney general (and those delegated to the BIA) 
concerning the INA.169 
In the wake of Cardoza-Fonseca, it seemed that the nexus 
between domestic asylum provisions and an established body of 
international law would render interpretation of those statutory 
provisions a question of pure statutory construction not entitled to 
Chevron deference. The Court’s opinion in Aguirre-Aguirre, however, 
revealed that the gap-filling–statutory construction distinction was 
highly malleable and capable of redefinition.170 The Court deferred to 
the BIA because the agency was “giv[ing] ambiguous statutory terms 
‘concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication.’”171 
Aguirre-Aguirre concerned the definition of a “serious 
nonpolitical crime” that, if committed before arriving in the United 
States, would render a noncitizen ineligible for withholding of 
removal under INA § 243(h)(2)(C).172 This provision mirrors Article 
1F(b) of the Convention.173 The BIA held that the provision applied 
to Aguirre-Aguirre, defining a “serious nonpolitical crime” based on 
 
 169. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999). The Court also reiterated its 
earlier observation that judicial deference is especially appropriate in the immigration context 
because foreign-relations concerns are implicated. Id. at 425 (citing INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 
110 (1988)). 
 170. See infra notes 171–72, 177–78, 182 and accompanying text; cf. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. at 455 (Scalia, J., concurring) (objecting to, as inconsistent with Chevron, the majority’s 
conclusion that pure questions of statutory construction are for the courts, not the agencies, to 
decide, “since in Chevron the Court deferred to the [EPA]’s abstract interpretation of the 
phrase ‘stationary source’”). 
 171. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425 (quoting Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448). 
 172. Id. at 418. 
 173. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6264, 189 
U.N.T.S. at 156. 
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a balancing test that it created in an earlier case.174 Without reference 
to Chevron, the Ninth Circuit rejected the BIA’s test.175 It held that 
because Congress intended the nonpolitical crimes exception to be 
consistent with Article 1F(b) of the Convention, the BIA should have 
considered additional factors enumerated in the UNHCR 
Handbook.176 In its very brief opinion, the Ninth Circuit did not cite to 
any other treaty interpretation sources apart from the Handbook. 
The Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in failing to 
analyze the BIA’s decision within the Chevron framework.177 
Ironically, the Court reiterated its conclusion from Cardoza-Fonseca 
that “‘one of Congress’ primary purposes’ in passing the Refugee Act 
was to implement the principles agreed to in the [Protocol].”178 The 
Court observed that the basic withholding provision “parallels Article 
33,” as well as the nonpolitical-crimes exception to Article 33 under 
Article 1F(b).179 The Court faulted the Ninth Circuit, however, for 
rejecting the BIA’s standard based entirely on the UNHCR 
Handbook, citing to Cardoza-Fonseca’s dictum, which stated that 
although the Handbook might provide “guidance in construing the 
provisions added to the INA by the Refugee Act,” it was not 
independently binding.180 
The Court made no attempt to determine the meaning of 
“serious political crime” in Article 1F(b) under international law. 
Instead of locating the UNHCR’s position within a broader 
international jurisprudential context, it simply concluded that because 
the Handbook was not directly binding on U.S. courts, it could not 
constrain the BIA’s interpretation of the corresponding domestic 
statute.181 Though the Court found that Congress intended to 
implement the Convention and that the statute and Article 1F(b) 
 
 174. The BIA’s test required a balancing of the criminal character of the noncitizen’s acts 
against their political nature. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 422–23 (citing In re McMullen, 19 I. & 
N. Dec. 90, 97–98 (B.I.A. 1984)). 
 175. See Aguirre-Aguirre v. INS, 121 F.3d 521, 523–24 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting the BIA’s 
errors of law and remanding the case to the BIA to correctly apply the law for determination of 
Aguirre-Aguirre’s eligibility for withholding of deportation), rev’d, 526 U.S. 415 (1999). 
 176. Id. at 523. 
 177. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424. 
 178. Id. at 427 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436–37 (1987)). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See id. at 427–28 (“[The Handbook] is not binding on . . . United States courts. . . . 
[T]he BIA’s determination that § 1253(h)(2)(C) requires no additional balancing of the risk of 
persecution rests on a fair and permissible reading of the statute.”). 
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were congruent, it curiously determined that the BIA’s construction 
was permissible under Chevron based on the text and structure of the 
domestic statute alone.182 
Aguirre-Aguirre’s cryptic, ill-reasoned conclusion has been used 
by advocates both for and against reliance on the Convention. On the 
one hand, the Court did not take issue with the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding that it was “bound to apply the Protocol in decisions 
regarding the withholding of deportation.”183 It affirmed the 
Handbook’s interpretive significance,184 reiterated congressional 
intent to implement the Protocol and Article 33,185 and referenced 
(albeit opaquely) another state party’s construction of Article 1F(b) 
in support of the BIA’s construction.186 On the other hand, Aguirre-
Aguirre’s disengagement with the Convention gave ammunition to 
government attorneys187 and comfort to lower court judges188 inclined 
 
 182. Id. at 428. 
 183. Aguirre-Aguirre v. INS, 121 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1997), rev’d, 526 U.S. 415 (1999). 
 184. The Court restricted its criticism of the Ninth Circuit to its apparent treatment of the 
Handbook as independently binding on U.S. courts. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 427–28. It 
found that other Handbook considerations identified by the Ninth Circuit were in fact 
consistent with the BIA’s test. See id. at 428–31 (noting that the Handbook’s consideration of 
the proportionality of the criminal acts to their objectives, as well as the political necessity of the 
acts, is consistent with the BIA’s test). 
 185. Id. at 427. 
 186. Perplexingly, the Court followed its conclusion with a citation to, and quote from, a 
decision of the U.K. House of Lords that supported the BIA’s construction. Id. at 428 (“[T]he 
crime either is or is not political when committed, and its character cannot depend on the 
consequences which the offender may afterwards suffer if he is returned.” (quoting T. v. Sec’y of 
State for the Home Dep’t, [1996] A.C. 742 (H.L.) 769 (appeal taken from Eng.))). The Court 
neglected to mention that the House of Lords was interpreting Article 1F(b). Read generously, 
the Court may have been indicating that the BIA’s interpretation was permissible because it was 
also consistent with at least one reading of Article 1F(b), which the Court considered the most 
compelling of the various sources interpreting the treaty provision. This is doubtful, however, 
given the the lack of explanation as to why that reading, and not the construction set out by the 
UNHCR, was the better interpretation of the Convention, and why the Court failed to 
reference any other treaty interpretation sources. 
 187. See, e.g., Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[This Court] defer[s] 
to most of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the national security exception to 
mandatory withholding of removal.”). In Ismoil Samadov’s case, which was consolidated with 
that of Yusupov, the petitioner argued that the court should construe the national security 
exception to asylum consistently with the symmetrical Convention provision, interpreted in light 
of the history of the treaty, the jurisprudence from states parties, and the views of the UNHCR. 
Brief of Petitioner at 26–44, Samadov v. Gonzales, 518 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3160), 
2006 WL 6210305. Government counsel described petitioner as insisting that the UNHCR’s 
opinion is “binding on both U.S. courts’ and the Attorney General’s interpretation of INA 
provisions,” observing that the Aguirre-Aguirre Court “rejected a similar argument claiming 
that the UNHCR Refugee Handbook controls domestic application of asylum law.” Brief for 
Respondent at 34–35, Samadov, 518 F.3d 185 (No. 06-3160), 2008 WL 5737676. Government 
FARBENBLUM IN REVISED PRINTER PROOF.DOC 1/24/2011  11:24:29 AM 
1092 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1059 
to defer to expansive agency constructions of government powers, 
unmoored from any Convention limitations.189 
C. Negusie: Orlando Ventura’s “Ordinary Remand Rule” Obfuscates 
Cardoza-Fonseca’s Chevron Step One Boundaries 
The Court most recently considered the relationship between 
Chevron deference and congressional intent to implement the 
Convention in Negusie. In Negusie, the Court remanded to the BIA 
based ostensibly on the application of INS v. Orlando Ventura’s 
“ordinary remand rule” requiring remand to the BIA to construe the 
statute in the first instance.190 The majority opinion and Justice 
Stevens’s partial concurrence are significant, however, for their 
treatment of congressional intent and the boundaries of Chevron’s 
two steps.191  
The legal issue in Negusie was relatively straightforward. The 
case concerned the INA’s “persecutor bar,”192 under which a person is 
not eligible for asylum193 or withholding of removal194 if the person had 
 
counsel further characterized petitioner’s argument for construction consistent with the 
Convention as “leav[ing] domestic law altogether,” arguing against petitioner’s proposed 
construction on the basis that “international law does not, and cannot, trump Congressional 
enactments.” Id. at *31–32. 
 188. See, e.g., Oral Argument at 11:31, Yusupov, 518 F.3d 185 (No. 06-3160), available at 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/06-3160SamadovvAttyGen.wma (questioning 
counsel for the petitioner on the implications of Aguirre-Aguirre, asking, “If the Attorney 
General, who, after all, is an officer of the United States . . . . If this is where he comes down on, 
why do I have to look at the U.N. Handbook?”). 
 189. Some lower courts treat the Handbook as a proxy for the Convention, citing Aguirre-
Aguirre in support of the outright rejection of proposed constructions of asylum provisions 
based on the Convention when the Handbook is the only international source cited. See, e.g., 
Toen Lik Tan v. Att’y Gen., 221 F. App’x 168, 171 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Tan frames this as a legal 
argument, apparently based on the fact that the IJ did not discuss the ‘cumulative harm theory’ 
as set forth in the [Handbook]. The UNHCR Handbook, however, ‘is not binding on the INS or 
American courts.’ Thus Tan has failed to raise a legal issue.” (citation omitted) (quoting 
Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 553 (3d Cir. 2001))). In fairness, this may also be the result of 
the manner in which counsel who do not draw on interpretive sources beyond the Handbook 
frame Convention-based arguments. 
 190. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1164 (2009) (citing INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 
U.S. 12, 16–17 (2002) (per curiam)). 
 191. See id. at 1163–64; id. at 1172 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 192. The persecutor bar was enacted as part of the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 
§ 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (2006)). 
 193. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (barring any noncitizen who has persecuted others 
from being granted asylum in the United States). 
 194. See id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (barring withholding of removal for any noncitizen who has 
persecuted others). 
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participated in the persecution of others.195 The question before the 
Court was whether the persecutor bar applied to individuals who 
engaged in persecution under coercion or duress.196 Although the 
exact language of the persecutor bar does not appear in the 
Convention, the statute’s legislative history indicates that Congress 
intended it to comport with principles underlying Article 1F(a) of the 
Convention.197 As the briefs filed by amici curiae reflected, leading 
refugee scholars agree that “the text, purpose, and history of the 
Convention . . . demonstrate that conduct performed under duress” 
does not exclude a person from the benefit of nonrefoulement.198 
Amici also cited to universal consistency with this position among 
courts of other states parties to the Convention.199 
The Fifth Circuit upheld the BIA decision that the persecutor 
bar applies regardless of coercion or duress. Its decision was based on 
the mechanical application of an earlier Supreme Court decision, 
Fedorenko v. United States,200 which concerned a provision of the 
Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (DPA).201 The Negusie majority in the 
Supreme Court held that Fedorenko was not controlling because the 
source of the INA’s persecutor bar was the Protocol, not the DPA.202 
 
 195. See id. § 1101(a)(42) (defining “refugee” to exclude any noncitizen who has persecuted 
others). 
 196. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1162 (2009). 
 197. See, e.g., Brief for Scholars of International Refugee Law as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 11–20, Negusie, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (No. 07-499), 2008 WL 2550611 (“The ‘persecutor 
bars’ at issue here . . . are inextricably linked to, and must be interpreted in light of, the United 
States’ obligations under [the Protocol].”); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Support of Petitioner at 6–9, Negusie, 129 S. Ct. 
1159 (No. 07-499), 2008 WL 2550609 (“[T]he legislative history demonstrates Congress’ clear 
intent that the bar be consistent with Article 1F(a) of the 1951 Convention, notwithstanding the 
difference in terminology between the statutory bar and Article 1F(a).”). The House Judiciary 
Committee amendment (later adopted by the full House) specifically noted that the bar “is 
consistent with the U.N. Convention (which does not apply to those who, inter alia, ‘committed 
a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity’).” H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 10, 
18 (1979). The Conference Committee adopted the House version of the withholding statute 
“with the understanding that it is based directly upon the language of the Protocol and it is 
intended that the provision be construed consistent with the Protocol.” H.R. REP. NO. 96-781, at 
20 (1980) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N 160, 161. And the Refugee Act’s 
exceptions to withholding were described as matching “those set forth in the aforementioned 
international agreements.” Id. 
 198. Brief for Scholars of International Refugee Law as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner, supra note 197, at 20. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981). 
 201. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1163 (citing Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 n.34 (1981)). 
 202. Id. at 1165–66. 
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Citing Aguirre-Aguirre and Cardoza-Fonseca, it again found that 
“‘one of Congress’ primary purposes’ in passing the Refugee Act was 
to implement the principles agreed to in the [Protocol].”203 
Applying Chevron and the Court’s 2002 decision in Orlando 
Ventura, the majority held in Negusie that because the BIA had 
mechanically applied Fedorenko, it should have an opportunity to 
determine “in the first instance” the legal question of whether the 
INA’s persecutor bar applies to actions committed under duress.204 In 
Orlando Ventura, the Court held that when statutes place an issue 
“primarily in agency hands,” courts should remand to “giv[e] the BIA 
the opportunity to address the matter in the first instance in light of 
its own experience.”205 Linking Orlando Ventura and Chevron, the 
majority in Negusie determined that the statutory construction issue 
was placed “in agency hands” because congressional intent was not 
clear under Chevron step one.206 
The majority opaquely reasoned that the statute was ambiguous 
simply because “[t]he parties disagree over whether coercion or 
duress is relevant . . . [and] there is substance to both contentions.”207 
Despite recognizing that the Refugee Act was intended to implement 
the Convention, the majority did not consider, or even mention, 
Article 1F or the Convention. Even more curiously, the Court 
distinguished Cardoza-Fonseca on the ground that this was not “a 
case where it is clear that Congress had an intention on the precise 
question at issue.”208 But it did not explain why the sources relied 
upon in Cardoza-Fonseca209 did not give rise to the same conclusion of 
 
 203. Id. at 1166 (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999)). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 1164 (alteration in original) (quoting INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–17 
(2002) (per curiam)). The majority described Orlando Ventura’s remand rule as existing, in part, 
because statutory ambiguities are delegations of authority to the agency that administers the 
statute. Id. at 1167 (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 980 (2005)). 
 206. Id. at 1164. Although the Court had already directly applied Orlando Ventura in the 
subsequent case of Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006) (per curiam), it had simply 
summarily reversed the appellate court’s decision in Thomas without explication of its Chevron 
implications. Id. at 187 (finding “no special circumstance here that might have justified the 
Ninth Circuit’s determination of the matter in the first instance” and stating that, “as in Ventura, 
the Court of Appeals should have applied the ‘ordinary “remand” rule’”). 
 207. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1164. 
 208. Id. (comparing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448–49 (1987)). 
 209. The Negusie majority cited to the portion of the Court’s opinion in Cardoza-Fonseca 
finding clear congressional intent to conform the statute to the Convention because of “the 
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clear congressional intent in Negusie. Instead, the majority held that 
petitioner’s invocation of concepts of international law “may be 
persuasive in determining whether a particular agency interpretation 
is reasonable, but they do not demonstrate that the statute is 
unambiguous.”210 This conclusion is particularly perplexing given that 
the Court’s basis for distinguishing Fedorenko was that the INA’s 
persecutor bar was intended to implement the Protocol, as opposed 
to the DPA.211 
Justice Stevens criticized the majority’s broadening of the ambit 
of agency deference as being inconsistent with Cardoza-Fonseca.212 
Articulating the more cogent view, he reasoned that the Court should 
decide the “narrow legal question” of whether the persecutor bar 
applies in the context of duress, and “remand for the agency to 
determine how the persecutor bar applies in individual cases.”213 
Justice Stevens concluded, based on the statute’s legislative history, 
that the persecutor bar specifically reflects the exclusion under 
Article 1F(a) of the Convention.214 He then determined whether 
Article 1F(a) was limited to criminally culpable conduct by looking to 
the UNHCR Handbook and the decisions of courts of other states 
parties to the Convention.215 In a conclusion that reinvigorated 
 
plain language of the Act, its symmetry with the United Nations Protocol, and its legislative 
history.” Id. at 1164. 
 210. Id. Part of the problem in this case may have been that the Convention argument was 
somewhat buried in the petitioner’s brief among general concepts of criminal and international 
law, with little space devoted to rigorous analysis of the legislative history related to the 
Convention or to the clear consensus about the proper interpretation of Article 1F(a). See Brief 
for Petitioner at 32–35, Negusie, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (No. 07-499), 2008 WL 2445504. 
 211. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1165–66. 
 212. Id. at 1170 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In particular, Justice 
Stevens criticized the majority for blurring the distinction between a “‘pure question of 
statutory construction for the courts to decide’ that we answered in Cardoza-Fonseca,” and “a 
fact-intensive question of the kind we addressed in Aguirre-Aguirre,” which demanded remand 
to the BIA. Id. at 1173. Although Justice Stevens acknowledged that the distinction was 
“subtle,” his characterization of the “serious non-political crime” standard at issue in Aguirre-
Aguirre as a fact-intensive inquiry, not a question of pure statutory construction, is logically 
difficult to understand. Id. at 1171. Nevertheless, he is correct that there is no logical basis for 
classifying the evidentiary standard for “well-founded fear of persecution” as a pure issue of 
statutory construction in Cardoza-Fonseca, but characterizing the requisite mental state for the 
persecutor bar as an issue for case-by-case determination by the BIA in Negusie. 
 213. Id. at 1173. 
 214. Id. at 1175 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 96-781, at 20 (1980) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 160, 161; H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 18 (1979)). 
 215. Id. at 1175 (“When we interpret treaties, we consider the interpretations of the courts 
of other nations, and we should do the same when Congress asks us to interpret a statute in light 
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Cardoza-Fonseca’s broad determination of congressional intent, 
Justice Stevens stated that “Congress’ effort to conform United States 
law to the standard set forth in the U.N. Convention and Protocol . . . 
underscores that Congress did not delegate the question presented by 
this case to the agency.”216 As discussed in the following Parts, lower 
courts should adopt this approach and cabin the import of the 
majority’s holding to achieve the conformity between domestic law 
and U.S. obligations under the Protocol that Congress intended. 
Several paths exist for doing so, both within and beyond the 
traditional Chevron doctrine. 
III.  ACHIEVING FIDELITY TO CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND U.S. 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: A PATH THROUGH CHEVRON 
Even after a quarter century of widespread application, the 
contours of Chevron deference remain nebulous with regard to BIA 
interpretations of the INA’s asylum and withholding provisions. 
Despite the trend toward increasing deference to the BIA, an 
enduring haziness has left several narrow paths by which lower courts 
may (and should) reject the BIA’s construction of the INA if it is 
inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the Protocol. 
A. Restoring Cardoza-Fonseca’s Definition of Chevron Step One 
In the narrower of the two available paths, courts may reject a 
Convention-incompatible construction under Chevron’s first step. 
With few exceptions,217 they may find that Congress expressed clear 
intent that INA asylum provisions be interpreted consistently with 
U.S. obligations under the Protocol and thus left no gap for the 
agency to fill.218 Applying Cardoza-Fonseca as Justice Stevens did in 
 
of a treaty’s language.” (citing Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226–28 
(1996))). 
 216. Id. at 1175. 
 217. Under the last-in-time rule of statutory construction (mandating that later laws 
abrogate contrary prior laws), it would be difficult to defend a statutory construction 
consistently with the Convention in the limited (highly problematic) instances in which the 
language of a particular statute is expressly inconsistent with the Convention. But see Julian G. 
Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 
IND. L.J. 319, 325–26 (2005) (describing unanimous criticism of the last-in-time rule within the 
legal academy, including the argument by some that treaties should hold superior status to all 
federal statutes). 
 218. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 & n.12, 433 (1987). 
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his concurrence in Negusie,219 courts may treat many apparent textual 
ambiguities in the Refugee Act as pure issues of statutory 
construction that may be resolved by reference to the Convention 
instead of by delegation to the BIA.220 The Court’s decisions in 
Negusie and Aguirre-Aguirre certainly impose obstacles, because the 
legal questions in those cases were held not to be issues of pure 
statutory construction. But both decisions nevertheless purported to 
leave Cardoza-Fonseca’s holding and case-by-case/statutory 
construction dichotomy intact. Both explicitly distinguished the 
statutory construction questions at issue from the question in 
Cardoza-Fonseca,221 albeit unconvincingly: it is difficult to identify any 
logical difference between the evidentiary standard for “well founded 
fear of persecution” at issue in Cardoza-Fonseca and the requisite 
mental state for the persecutor bar at issue in Negusie222 or the criteria 
for defining a “serious political crime” at issue in Aguirre-Aguirre.223 
Indeed, Justices Stevens and Breyer found the two issues analogous 
in Negusie.224 The Court’s failure in Negusie and Aguirre-Aguirre to 
identify any persuasive legal or logical basis for its distinctions 
suggests there is room to analogize most Refugee Act statutory 
construction questions to the “pure question of statutory 
construction” in Cardoza-Fonseca,225 which the Supreme Court has 
continued to explicitly affirm as the relevant benchmark and the 
critical first step of the Chevron analysis. 
Relatedly, courts may distinguish Aguirre-Aguirre and Negusie 
on the basis of a particular provision’s plain language, its symmetry 
with the Protocol’s language, and its legislative history.226 Indeed, 
 
 219. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1170–72 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 220. See id.; Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 
(1984) (“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject 
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.”); see also Coyle, 
supra note 39, at 663 (defining a “borrowed treaty rule” under which “courts should presume 
that the text of a statute that incorporates language or concepts from a treaty should be read to 
conform to the meaning of the text of the source treaty, regardless of whether the statute is 
ambiguous” with this presumption rebuttable only by “compelling evidence that Congress 
intended a different result”). 
 221. See Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1167 (majority opinion); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 
415, 424–25 (1999). 
 222. See Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1172 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 223. See id. at 1173. 
 224. See id. at 1170–73. 
 225. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987). 
 226. The Supreme Court and at least one appellate court have considered symmetrical 
language “one of the strongest indicators that Congress intended to incorporate the 
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courts seeking to distinguish Negusie may benefit from the Court’s 
failure to identify any particular basis on which it distinguished the 
clarity of congressional intent in Cardoza-Fonseca from the clarity of 
congressional intent in Negusie. Alternately, Negusie’s holding may 
be confined to cases like Orlando Ventura, in which the BIA had not 
yet construed the relevant statutory provision in the first instance, as 
opposed to cases in which courts are reviewing the BIA’s construction 
of a particular provision. 
B. Chevron Step Two and Other Canons of Statutory Construction 
In cases in which a court is unwilling or unable to determine that 
a particular Refugee Act provision reflects clear congressional intent 
to implement a parallel provision of the Convention, it may 
nevertheless deny deference to a Convention-incompatible BIA 
construction by applying other canons of statutory construction—
either directly or under the second step of Chevron. 
As an initial matter, courts may invoke the rule of lenity227 or the 
principle of constitutional avoidance228 to read immigration statutes in 
a manner that, although not explicitly rights-protective, frequently 
accords with U.S. obligations under the Convention.229 Indeed, the 
 
understanding of the Protocol developed under international law into the U.S. statutory 
scheme.” Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 204 n.32 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Sale v. Haitian 
Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 180 & n.36 (1993), and Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 429, 432, 
437, in support of its observation that “[t]he adoption of essentially identical language [in the 
nonrefoulement provision of Refugee Act of 1980] to that contained in article 33 of the 
[Convention] . . . is one of the strongest indicators that Congress intended to incorporate the 
understanding of the Protocol developed under international law into the U.S. statutory 
scheme”). In some cases, the lack of a direct relationship between the text of Article 1F and the 
persecutor bar in Negusie may be a basis on which to distinguish that case, though this approach 
risks undermining congruence arguments in other cases in which the statutory language may not 
be identical to that of the Convention. 
 227. The rule of lenity is a “longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in 
deportation statutes in favor of the alien.” Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449 (citing INS v. 
Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966); Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 128 (1964); Fong Haw Tan v. 
Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)). 
 228. Under this canon of statutory construction, ambiguities in a statute are read to avoid 
constitutional doubt. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689–90, 697 (2001) (interpreting 
a statute to require a reasonable limit on the amount of time an alien can be detained to avoid 
the constitutional issue implicated by indefinite detention). 
 229. See generally Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: 
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 564 (1990) 
(discussing the application of the constitutional avoidance canon and resultant “phantom 
constitutional norms” that have developed in immigration decisions, and observing that 
“phantom norms produce results that are much more sympathetic to aliens than the results that 
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Supreme Court has given the constitutional avoidance canon 
precedence over Chevron deference.230  
Alternately, courts may find a Convention-incompatible BIA 
construction unreasonable under the second step of Chevron because 
it is inconsistent with general congressional intent to bring U.S. 
immigration law into conformity with the Convention, even if that 
intent is not perceived as sufficiently clear on the face of a particular 
provision to warrant deference.231 A court could also find the 
interpretation unreasonable by applying the canon of statutory 
interpretation that presumes that acts of Congress are consistent with 
U.S. treaty obligations and, absent a clear contrary statement by 
Congress, should be interpreted as such.232 More broadly, it could 
apply the centuries-old Charming Betsy principle, which requires that 
an act of Congress be construed so as not to conflict with 
international law unless no other construction is fairly possible.233 
 
would follow from the interpretation of statutes in light of the expressly applicable 
constitutional immigration law based on plenary power”). 
 230. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 
U.S. 568, 574–75 (1988). 
 231. This approach has been proposed by commentators in other areas of law. See, e.g., Alex 
O. Canizares, Is Charming Betsy Losing Her Charm? Interpreting U.S. Statutes Consistently with 
International Trade Agreements and the Chevron Doctrine, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 591, 641 
(2006) (arguing that in international trade cases, if a statute is ambiguous, the court should turn 
to relevant international trade law in inquiring into the reasonableness of an agency 
construction under Chevron’s second step). 
 232. The BIA has directly applied this principle to the construction of asylum provisions. 
See In re Q-T-M-T-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 639, 660 (B.I.A. 1996) (“Domestic law may supersede 
international obligations only by express abrogation or by subsequent legislation that 
irrevocably conflicts with international obligations.” (citing Chew Heong v. United States, 112 
U.S. 536, 538 (1884); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957))). The BIA has held that in relation 
to asylum provisions, “Congress has not expressed any intention of reneging on the 
international obligations assumed through accession to the 1967 Protocol via the Refugee Act of 
1980, nor has Congress articulated any desire to curtail refugee protections beyond the 
limitations set out in the Protocol.” Id. But see Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 632 n.3 
(3d Cir. 2006) (deciding a one-year asylum bar did not violate the Supremacy Clause even 
though it explicitly limited asylum, which is inconsistent with Article 34 of the Convention). 
 233. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114 
(1987) (“Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict 
with international law or with an international agreement of the United States.”); see also 
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29–30, 32–33 (1981) (looking to international law in 
interpreting a statute prohibiting employment discrimination against U.S. citizens on military 
bases overseas unless permitted by the treaty); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953) 
(looking to the law of nations in determining statutory construction of the Jones Act in a 
maritime tort case); Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 539–40 (interpreting an immigration statute so as 
to not conflict with the treaty right of Chinese aliens to enter the United States). 
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International law in this case would include both the Protocol and the 
nonrefoulement obligation under customary international law.234 
In Negusie’s case, for example, if the BIA were to reach the 
same interpretation on remand, a reviewing court could reject that 
interpretation as unreasonable under Chevron step two. In light of its 
inconsistency with international law,235 the BIA’s interpretation would 
be unreasonable because (a) it would be inconsistent with 
congressional intent that U.S. law be interpreted consistently with the 
scope of the nonrefoulement obligation under the Convention; (b) it 
would violate the presumption that Congress intended the statute to 
be interpreted consistent with the nation’s treaty obligations under 
the Protocol; and (c) applying the Charming Betsy principle, refugee 
provisions of the INA should be interpreted, insofar as is possible, 
consistently with the Convention and with the nonrefoulement 
obligation under customary international law. 
This last proposal is on safer doctrinal ground than it may first 
appear. Over the past decade, several commentators have grappled 
with the relationship between Chevron and canons of statutory 
construction, described by Professor Curtis Bradley in 2000 as “one of 
the most uncertain aspects of the Chevron doctrine.”236 In his seminal 
article on Chevron deference and foreign affairs, Bradley concluded 
that, in general, the Charming Betsy canon should not trump Chevron 
deference.237 He reasoned that if Charming Betsy were to trump 
Chevron, “it must be because Congress itself rather than 
administrative agencies should deliberate on whether to violate 
international law.”238 Bradley rejected this possibility, concluding that 
the executive branch’s foreign relations expertise—including its 
knowledge of “international facts”—combined with the president’s 
political accountability to make the executive branch better suited 
than Congress or the courts to determine a potential conflict with 
international law.239 In an important qualification, however, Bradley 
acknowledged that it may not make sense to apply this conclusion to 
agencies that do not have the foreign affairs expertise that the 
 
 234. See supra note 30. A century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court held that customary 
international law is “part of our [U.S.] law.” The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
 235. See supra notes 197–99 and accompanying text. 
 236. Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 675 
(2000). 
 237. Id. at 679. 
 238. Id. at 688. 
 239. Id. at 720–21. 
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president or State Department have, or that do not have the political 
accountability that derives from acting as a direct agent of the 
president.240 
Writing in 2007, Professors Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein 
extended Bradley’s position with admitted radical implications.241 
Observing that the case law remained unsettled, they argued that as a 
normative matter, courts should permit the executive to interpret 
ambiguous statutes inconsistently with international law, even outside 
the traditional Chevron context of rulemaking and adjudication of 
agency-administered statutes.242 They articulated a “consequentialist 
theory,” which explains that courts apply international relations 
canons because the benefits to U.S. interests outweigh the costs.243 For 
example, the Charming Betsy canon reflects an assessment that 
compliance with international law provides a net benefit to the 
United States because other states protected by the law might 
otherwise retaliate against the United States, and because compliance 
with international law might have long-term foreign relations 
benefits.244 The argument for deference, according to Posner and 
Sunstein, is that because the executive has greater expertise and 
accountability than the courts concerning foreign relations,245 it is 
better positioned to make consequentialist judgments about the risks 
and value to American interests of interpreting statutes inconsistently 
with international law.246 
These contentions, even if justified, would not undermine the 
basic thesis of this Article. Most importantly, they concern only 
executive interpretations made in the absence of clear congressional 
intent; they do not countermand the conclusion that courts ought to 
reject Convention-inconsistent interpretations under Chevron step 
one because of clear congressional intent that U.S. asylum provisions 
be interpreted consistently with the Convention. But even if courts do 
not find clear congressional intent in a particular provision, three 
further considerations demonstrate why the Posner-Sunstein 
contentions do not undercut doctrinal and normative bases for courts’ 
 
 240. Id. at 694–95. 
 241. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE 
L.J. 1170, 1177 (2007). 
 242. Id. at 1202–04. 
 243. Id. at 1184–87. 
 244. Id. at 1188–89. 
 245. Id. at 1207. 
 246. Id. at 1227–28. 
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rejection, under Chevron step two, of BIA statutory interpretations 
that are inconsistent with the Convention. 
First, Bradley, Posner, and Sunstein agree that only reasonable 
executive interpretations deserve deference.247 But they do not 
consider how reasonableness might intersect with international 
comity. Recognizing the fundamental connection between U.S. 
asylum provisions and international refugee law, the Supreme Court 
confirmed in Negusie that—at least in the asylum context—
international law “may be persuasive in determining whether a 
particular agency interpretation is reasonable.”248 This is not the first 
time courts have recognized international law as a potential basis for 
rejecting an inconsistent BIA statutory interpretation. In several 
notable exceptions to the general tendency to disregard international 
law, the BIA249 and federal courts have applied the Charming Betsy 
canon in immigration appeals,250 including as a basis for construing 
asylum provisions consistently with the Convention.251 
 
 247. Id. at 1178; see also Bradley, supra note 236, at 703. 
 248. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1164 (2009). In contrast to Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence, which categorically deferred to the BIA, id. at 1170 (Scalia, J., concurring), the 
majority did not rule that the BIA’s construction should be given deference; it merely concluded 
that the agency should have the opportunity to interpret the provision in the first instance. Id. at 
1168 (majority opinion). 
 249. See In re Q-T-M-T-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 639, 660 (B.I.A. 1996) (“Courts must strive to 
interpret domestic legislation in a way that is consistent with international obligations. This 
could not be more pertinent a principle than it is in the construction now before us, as . . . ‘one 
of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with 
the [Protocol].’” (second alteration in original) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 
436 (1987)) (citing Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982); Murray v. Schooner Charming 
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804))). 
 250. See, e.g., Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(characterizing the Charming Betsy doctrine as a “presumption that Congress intends to 
legislate in a manner consistent with international law”); United States v. Schiffer, 836 F. Supp. 
1164, 1170 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (stating that it is a “well-settled rule of statutory construction” 
that courts should interpret acts of Congress in a manner consistent with international law), 
aff’d, 31 F.3d 1175 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 251. See Ali v. Ashcroft, 213 F.R.D. 390, 405 (W.D. Wash.) (“Because Respondents’ 
proposed interpretation of the statute may result in persecution or deprivation of life in 
violation of international law, Petitioners’ proposed construction is preferred as it reconciles the 
statute with the law of nations.”), aff’d on other grounds, 346 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2003), opinion 
withdrawn, 421 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1114 & 
n.30 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We have reaffirmed [the Charming Betsy] rule on several occasions. . . . 
Although Congress may override international law in enacting a statute, we do not presume that 
Congress had such an intent when the statute can reasonably be reconciled with the law of 
nations.”). 
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Second, whatever merit the consequentialist theory might have 
in relation to international law governing state interests, human rights 
treaties demand a different calculus. Because the rights regulated are 
primarily those of individuals rather than states, the decision of 
whether to comply with international law goes beyond a foreign 
relations cost-benefit analysis. The next Part explores this issue in 
greater detail as a substantive concern in relation to the application of 
the Chevron framework to the asylum context.252 
Finally, as Bradley alluded, neither the foreign-relations-
expertise nor the political-accountability rationale for deference 
applies to the BIA and the immigration courts. The next Part 
explores this issue in detail as well, arguing that the Supreme Court 
should consider boldly addressing the broader question of whether, in 
light of the Convention’s application and current problems with BIA 
adjudication, the Chevron framework is suitable in the asylum context 
at all. 
IV.  BEYOND CHEVRON: GETTING PAST REFLEXIVE DEFERENCE TO 
THE BIA’S INTERPRETATION OF REFUGEE PROVISIONS 
A. The Core Rationales Underpinning Deference 
In Chevron, the Court accorded deference to the EPA on several 
bases: the agency’s expertise (in light of the fact that the regulatory 
scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in 
a “detailed and reasoned fashion,” and “judges are not experts in the 
field”);253 political accountability (because the decision involved 
balancing the conflicting policy interests of economic growth versus 
environmental objectives254 and “federal judges—who have no 
constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made 
by those who do”);255 and an implied delegation of authority by 
Congress to agencies to interpret the statutes that they administer.256 
 
 252. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 253. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863, 865 (1984). 
 254. Id. at 863. 
 255. Id. at 866. 
 256. Id. at 843–44; see also id. at 865 (considering but not deciding that perhaps Congress 
was “thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering 
the provision would be in a better position to do so”); cf. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) (“[A]mbiguities in statutes within an agency’s 
jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in 
reasonable fashion.”). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum 
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Courts and commentators have proposed another reasonable 
rationale for deference: a desire for uniformity in a particular area of 
administrative law, which can be undermined by conflicting 
jurisprudence across federal circuits.257 In the immigration sphere, 
courts have also deferred to BIA interpretations based on the 
perception that immigration decisions implicate foreign relations and 
are thus an area of particular executive expertise.258 
All of these rationales are legitimate bases for deference in most 
areas in which agencies are indeed expert and are at some level 
politically accountable for their policy choices. The realities of 
immigration agency decisionmaking, however, have proven each of 
these rationales to be an increasingly unjustifiable basis for agency 
deference in a growing number of cases. It is no longer possible (if it 
ever was) to sustain the legal fiction that the BIA is a consistently 
expert, competent, politically accountable agency that produces a 
well-reasoned, reliable body of asylum jurisprudence deserving of 
lockstep deference by federal courts. The Chevron framework also 
raises specific separation-of-powers concerns in the refugee context 
because, in light of the statute’s treaty underpinnings, agency 
deference allows the executive to redefine the legal boundaries of its 
conduct with respect to refugees. 
B. Problems with the Political-Accountability Rationale and 
Separation-of-Powers Concerns 
The Chevron Court viewed the statutory interpretation question 
as involving “competing views of the public interest,” that were best 
informed by “the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy.”259 
In addition to the general problems with this rationale,260 it is, for 
substantive and structural reasons, particularly inapplicable in the 
asylum context. 
 
of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to 
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1085–89 (2008) (discussing the reasons and considerations 
underpinning the Court’s decision in Chevron). 
 257. See Kane, supra note 6, at 557–58 (“Because federal agencies practice nationwide, it is 
preferable to have one legal standard governing that practice, rather than a motley collection of 
standards that vary based on the happenstance of federal circuit jurisdiction.”). 
 258. E.g., INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988). 
 259. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66. 
 260. For example, the Chevron Court itself recognized that courts are able to, and do, 
decide policy questions. Id. at 865 (noting that courts sometimes “reconcile competing political 
interests”); see also Kane, supra note 6, at 563–66 (noting problems with the democratic-
principle rationale for agency deference). 
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1. Substantive Concerns.  Unlike other areas of government 
regulation, refugee law is by definition not an area in which the 
executive has unfettered discretion. Congress intended for the INA’s 
asylum provisions to be interpreted in light of the Convention from 
which they are derived,261 not to be informed by a particular 
administration’s political preferences. Indeed, even statutory 
provisions that appear facially ambiguous were enacted subject to 
congressional intent “to afford a generous standard for [refugee] 
protection in cases of doubt.”262 This restriction is particularly 
significant in the area of immigration and border control, in which 
government power is otherwise considered “plenary.”263 
Although some decisions made by immigration officials—such as 
tourist or business visa grants—may legitimately implicate foreign 
relations concerns,264 the balancing of competing policy considerations 
that prompted the Court’s deference in Chevron265 is “fundamentally 
at odds with acceptance of international law as a constraint on policy 
choices and a limit on government freedom to deal as it pleases with 
individuals possessing rights under international agreements” like the 
Convention.266 Overlooking this constraint, the Court in Aguirre-
Aguirre found judicial deference to the executive especially 
appropriate in the immigration context because of potential foreign 
relations implications.267 It explained that “[a] decision by the 
Attorney General to deem certain violent offenses committed in 
another country as political in nature, and to allow the perpetrators to 
remain in the United States, may affect our relations with that 
 
 261. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1165–66 (2009). 
 262. In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 492 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 263. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 201 (1993). 
 264. Cf. Michael G. Heyman, Immigration Law in the Supreme Court: The Flagging Spirit of 
the Law, 28 J. LEGIS. 113, 142 (2002) (arguing that the Court should not treat BIA officials as 
legitimate formulators of U.S. foreign policy). 
 265. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (deferring to the EPA’s interpretation on the basis that “the 
Administrator’s interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing 
interests . . . and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies”). 
 266. Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 8. Compare Bradley, supra note 236, at 679–90 (arguing 
that Chevron deference to the executive should trump judicial comity doctrines, but that this 
should not apply to agencies that do not have foreign affairs expertise justifying the deference), 
with Posner & Sunstein, supra note 241, at 1178–82 (arguing that executive interpretations 
should be permitted to trump judicial comity doctrines so long as those interpretations are 
reasonable, even outside the traditional Chevron context of rulemaking and adjudication of 
agency-administered statutes). For a more substantial discussion, see supra Part III.B. 
 267. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (citing INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 
(1988)). 
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country or its neighbors.”268 The Court concluded that “[t]he judiciary 
is not well positioned to shoulder primary responsibility for assessing 
the likelihood and importance of such diplomatic repercussions.”269 
What the Court failed to recognize in Aguirre-Aguirre is that when 
Congress decided to “bring United States refugee law into 
conformance” with the nation’s international treaty obligations,270 it 
foreclosed the executive’s discretion to consider the diplomatic 
repercussions of compliance with those obligations.271 The BIA has 
itself recognized that although it may be prudent to exercise great 
caution before condemning acts of another state, “this is not a reason 
for narrowly applying asylum law.”272 The agency has explained that 
“[a] decision to grant asylum is not an unfriendly act precisely 
because it is not a judgment about the country involved, but a 
judgment about the reasonableness of the applicant’s belief that 
persecution was based on a protected ground.”273 The BIA has 
cautioned against confusing the distinction “between the goals of 
refugee law (which protects individuals) and politics (which manages 
the relations between political bodies)” when interpreting domestic 
asylum provisions.274  
A related separation-of-powers concern stems from the distinct 
nature of refugee law as compared to other areas of government 
regulation, such as tobacco or emissions standards, in which the 
government regulates private parties. In the refugee context, 
deference to the executive’s policy decisions risks preferencing the 
 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987); see also supra note 36. 
 271. Human rights treaties by definition limit state sovereignty and government power. 
 272. In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 493 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 273. Id. at 492. 
 274. Id. at 492–93; see also Matthew E. Price, Politics or Humanitarianism? Recovering the 
Political Roots of Asylum, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 277, 279 & nn.6–8, 280 & nn.9–14, 281 & nn.15–
20, 282 (2005) (noting that there is a broader philosophical debate regarding the political versus 
humanitarian nature of asylum, but observing that when the international community was 
considering the 1967 Protocol, the U.N. General Assembly made clear that “[t]he grant of 
asylum by a State . . . is a peaceful and humanitarian act and . . . as such, it cannot be regarded as 
unfriendly by any other [S]tate” (second alteration in original) (quoting Declaration on 
Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII), U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. 
Doc. A/6716, at 81 (Dec. 14, 1967))). Treaty interpretation sometimes involves policy choices, 
particularly when interpretive sources conflict. But because granting asylum is not an unfriendly 
act against another state, those policy choices are circumscribed and may only be made in the 
course of the bona fide application of international treaty interpretation principles, including, in 
the case of refugee law, taking into account the Convention’s rights-protective purpose. 
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government’s interest in maximizing its discretion with respect to 
immigration over the rights of refugees whom the government bears a 
burden to protect under international law. Thus, when courts defer 
under Chevron to BIA policy decisions, they invariably accede to the 
executive’s demand for discretion to expel a person from the United 
States—even though Congress tasked the executive with ensuring 
that persons qualifying as refugees are not expelled in violation of 
U.S. international obligations.275 Indeed, international law supplies an 
international analog to the domestic rule of lenity, requiring that 
Convention provisions be interpreted in light of the Convention’s 
rights-protective object and purpose.276 Consistent with that purpose, 
as the Third Circuit recently observed, “Congress intended to allow 
exceptions to our nonrefoulement obligations only in a narrow set of 
circumstances.”277 Thus, when courts defer to expansive BIA 
interpretations of the INA’s exceptions to asylum or withholding of 
removal, or narrow interpretations of the refugee definition, they 
allow the executive to redefine the limits of its own statutorily defined 
power. 
These concerns would apply equally to deference to the BIA’s 
direct interpretation of the Convention, if the agency were to engage 
in such an analysis. Although courts have not articulated a framework 
for determining the weight given to executive treaty interpretations, 
Professor Evan Criddle has observed that “U.S. jurisprudence does 
not support the proposition that deference to executive agencies 
should displace judicial interpretation of ambiguous treaty 
provisions.”278 He argues persuasively that if executive treaty 
 
 275. This concern would be alleviated if the executive were to adopt a policy of ensuring 
that government litigation positions reflect a bona fide interpretation of domestic refugee law 
consistent with international law. See infra Part V.B.2. 
 276. Federal courts have recognized that when Congress enacted the Refugee Act, it 
intended to bring U.S. law into conformity with the provisions of the Convention, not just on 
their face but also as interpreted in light of the Convention’s rights-protective purpose. See 
Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 203 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The legislative history of the Refugee 
Act of 1980 makes clear that Congress intended to protect refugees to the fullest extent of our 
Nation’s international obligations.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); Marincas v. Lewis, 
92 F.3d 195, 198 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Refugee Act was enacted to fulfill our treaty obligations 
under the [1967] U.N. Protocol for the benefit of aliens . . . who claim to be fleeing persecution in 
their homelands.” (emphasis added)); supra notes 9, 42, 72 and accompanying text. 
 277. Yusupov, 518 F.3d at 204. 
 278. Evan Criddle, Comment, Chevron Deference and Treaty Interpretation, 112 YALE L.J. 
1927, 1932 (2003) (citing O’Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27, 32 (1986)); see also Kolovrat v. 
Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) (constraining deference with the caveat that “courts interpret 
treaties for themselves”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
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interpretations are entitled to any deference at all, it should be the 
“persuasiveness” deference standard articulated in Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co.,279 under which the degree of deference would turn upon 
multiple factors, including “the agency’s relevant expertise, the 
cogency of the agency’s reasoning, . . . and the interpretation’s 
potential to promote transnational legal order.”280 Professors Derek 
Jinks and Neal Katyal have similarly argued that substantial 
deference to executive treaty interpretations is inappropriate, at least 
in the “executive-constraining zone”—that is, in the domain of 
international law made at least in part outside the executive branch 
that conditions the exercise of executive power.281 
2. Structural Concerns.  Structurally, the political accountability 
rationale fails in the refugee context because neither the BIA nor IJs 
are actually politically accountable for their decisions.282 Even 
assuming that the general public could somehow hold the attorney 
general accountable for the content of BIA decisions under the 
current immigration adjudication system,283 there could be no 
accountability in practice because the procedures and many decisions 
of the BIA and immigration courts are not publicly available. 
 
UNITED STATES § 326 (1989) (“Courts in the United States have final authority to interpret an 
international agreement for purposes of applying it as law in the United States . . . .”). 
 279. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 280. Criddle, supra note 278, at 1933–34. Professor Criddle contends that in addition to 
separation-of-powers concerns, deference to the executive’s domestic-policy-driven 
interpretation of international treaties would “invite inconsistency between domestic and 
foreign treaty constructions; draw U.S. treaty law into conflict with international law; and 
provoke reciprocal, self-serving interpretations by foreign treaty partners.” Id. at 1930; cf. 
Bradley, supra note 236, at 702 (noting that courts should apply Chevron deference to executive 
treaty interpretation based on the presumption that “United States treatymakers have 
delegated interpretive power to the executive branch because of its special expertise in foreign 
affairs”). 
 281. Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
1230, 1234 (2007) (responding to and disagreeing with Posner and Sunstein’s proposal to 
increase deference to the executive); see also supra Part III.B. 
 282. The Chevron Court acknowledged that the EPA was not directly accountable to the 
public either, but it held that the agency was sufficiently accountable because of its ultimate 
accountability through the executive. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). Commentators have questioned this proposition, suggesting that no 
administrative agencies are truly politically accountable. See, e.g., Kane, supra note 6, at 570 & 
nn.277–80, 571 (discussing various commentators’ rationales for arguing that agencies run by 
unelected civil servants are not politically accountable). 
 283. It is questionable whether the general public is even aware that the BIA—in contrast to 
an agency such as the EPA—is an executive body performing the attorney general’s 
administrative function, rather than an Article III court. 
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Because most of the decisions that those agencies make—policy 
related or otherwise—are unpublished, they are structurally insulated 
from any form of public input at the front end or ballot-box 
accountability after the fact.284 Ironically, the BIA decision to which 
the Court deferred in Aguirre-Aguirre was unpublished and would 
have remained secret had Aguirre-Aguirre not appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit. The relevant public would never have known that a foreign 
relations policy decision had been made, let alone have been able to 
influence it or hold someone in the executive branch accountable. 
C. Problems with the Agency-Expertise Rationale 
1. Interpretation in a “Detailed and Reasoned Fashion.”  As 
BIA285 and Immigration Court286 resources have been cut and these 
bodies have become increasingly stretched, cases in which they 
consider issues in a “detailed and reasoned fashion”287 are increasingly 
few and far between. Courts across the country have criticized a 
number of the BIA’s decisions as poorly reasoned, superficial, ill 
considered, and betraying a lack of the detailed consideration the 
Chevron Court attributed to administrative agencies.288 Criticism of IJ 
 
 284. See Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983, 987 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We have also 
indicated that nonprecedential BIA decisions might receive less deference than those 
designated as precedential.”). 
 285. In 2008, the BIA adjudicated 38,369 cases. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, 
FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at ES-31 (2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/media/nosearch/
immigration_reform_executive_summary_012510.pdf. This remarkably high adjudication rate 
has come at the expense of a diminished likelihood of identifying IJ error and a lack of unified 
precedential guidance coming from the BIA. Id. 
 286. Id. at ES-28. In 2008, each IJ issued an average of 1,014 decisions—approximately 
nineteen decisions every week. Id. IJs predictably have inadequate time and resources to 
formulate well-reasoned opinions in many cases, a problem which is compounded by inadequate 
support staff and law clerks. Id. They frequently issue oral decisions without sufficient time to 
conduct thorough legal research or properly analyze legal and evidentiary issues. Id. at ES-30. 
 287. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 288. Id.; see also Ayala v. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 943, 951 (11th Cir. 2010) (remanding to 
the BIA because “[t]he decision of the Board is riddled with error” and the BIA and IJ “fail[ed] 
to render a reasoned decision”); Haile v. Holder, 591 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2010) (remanding 
to the BIA for a second time because “the Board’s conclusion [that denationalization alone 
does not constitute persecution] doesn’t follow from its premise, and unlike a jury an 
administrative agency has to provide a reasoned justification for its rulings”); Parlak v. Holder, 
578 F.3d 457, 471, 480 (6th Cir. 2009) (Martin, J., dissenting) (“This record is replete with 
error . . . .”); Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 111 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are deeply disturbed by 
what we perceive to be fairly obvious errors in the agency’s application of its own regulatory 
framework. . . . The claims of the petitioners before us, as set forth below, did not receive the 
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decisions has sometimes extended beyond allegations of 
incompetence and ignorance to include personal bias and hostility 
toward individuals seeking asylum.289 Indeed, in some cases, federal 
judges have viewed decisionmaking by IJs and the BIA as sufficiently 
inept as to have “fallen below the minimum standards of legal 
justice.”290 Although many IJs and BIA members legitimately employ 
 
type of careful analysis they were due.”); N’Diom v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 494, 500 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(Martin, J., concurring) (observing “the significantly increasing rate at which adjudication 
lacking in reason, logic, and effort” reaches the federal courts); Pasha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 530, 
531 (7th Cir. 2005) (“At the risk of sounding like a broken record, we reiterate our oft-
expressed concern with the adjudication of asylum claims by the Immigration Court and the 
Board of Immigration Appeals . . . . The performance of these federal agencies is too often 
inadequate. This case presents another depressing example.” (citation omitted)); Ssali v. 
Gonzales, 424 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2005) (“This very significant mistake suggests that the 
Board was not aware of the most basic facts of [the petitioner’s] case . . . .”); Grupee v. 
Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1026, 1028 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that the IJ’s unexplained conclusion is 
“hard to take seriously”); Zewdie v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 804, 807 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he 
immigration judge failed to articulate a reasoned analysis based on the record evidence for 
denying [the petitioner’s] claims.”); Kourski v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1038, 1039 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(“There is a gaping hole in the reasoning of the board and the immigration judge.”); Galina v. 
INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The Board’s analysis was woefully inadequate, 
indicating that it has not taken to heart previous judicial criticisms of its performance in asylum 
cases. The elementary principles of administrative law, the rules of logic, and common sense 
seem to have eluded the Board in this as in other cases.” (citations omitted)). 
 289. See, e.g., Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The IJ’s 
finding . . . was grounded solely on speculation and conjecture.”); Wang v. Att’y Gen., 423 F.3d 
260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the sarcasm of the IJ seem 
more appropriate to a court television show than a federal court proceeding.”); Dawoud v. 
Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The IJ’s opinion is riddled with inappropriate and 
extraneous comments . . . .”); Sosnovskaia v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The 
procedure that the IJ employed in this case is an affront to [the petitioner’s] right to be heard.”); 
Fiadjoe v. Att’y Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that the IJ’s “hostile” and 
“extraordinarily abusive” conduct toward petitioner “by itself would require a rejection of his 
credibility finding”); Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 
IJ’s assessment of Petitioner’s credibility was skewed by prejudgment, personal speculation, 
bias, and conjecture . . . .”); Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 272, 292 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is the 
IJ’s conclusion, not [the petitioner’s] testimony, that ‘strains credulity.’”); see also Memorandum 
from Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Att’y Gen., to Members of the BIA (Jan. 9, 2006), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/ag-010906-boia.pdf (noting with concern that recent 
reports have indicated that some IJs “fail to treat aliens appearing before them with appropriate 
respect and consideration” and acknowledging that the conduct of some IJs “can aptly be 
described as intemperate or even abusive”). 
 290. Morales Apolinar v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Benslimane v. 
Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005)). Writing for the majority in Benslimane, Judge 
Richard Posner, one of the most outspoken critics of the BIA on the federal bench, observed 
that in one year alone, the Seventh Circuit had reversed the BIA in whole or part in a staggering 
40 percent of cases, compared with 18 percent of civil cases during the same period in which the 
United States was the appellee. Benslimane, 430 F.3d at 829. 
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their best efforts under grossly inadequate resources,291 the growing 
judicial skepticism toward Immigration Court and BIA decisions has 
become so significant that it has been described as an “important—
though often overlooked—thread of modern immigration 
jurisprudence.”292 
2. BIA’s Expertise Relative to the Courts’.  Since the Court held in 
Aguirre-Aguirre that the Chevron framework applies to BIA 
interpretations of the INA,293 two major structural changes have 
altered the balance of interpretive expertise such that the BIA’s 
expertise has diminished as courts of appeals’ expertise has increased. 
First, various “streamlining procedures” have further reduced the 
time and resources the BIA is able to devote to individual cases.294 
Indeed, courts have questioned whether an IJ decision affirmed 
without opinion by the BIA through the streamlining process should 
 
 291. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 285, at ES-28. 
 292. Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 
1672 (2007); see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND 
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 751–52 (5th ed. 2009) (gathering citations to numerous recent 
proposals to reform the immigration adjudication system in light of problems with the 
independence of adjudicators and the quality of decisionmaking); Stephen H. Legomsky, 
Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1639 (2010) (observing that 
problems with the fairness, accuracy, and consistency of BIA decisionmaking are rooted in 
“severe underfunding, reckless procedural shortcuts, the inappropriate politicization of the 
process, and a handful of adjudicators personally ill suited to the task”); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, 
Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum 
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 303 (2007) (“[V]ery significant differences from one 
decision maker to the next in the adjudication of asylum cases should be a matter of serious 
concern to federal policymakers.”); Eliot Walker, Asylees in Wonderland: A New Procedural 
Perspective on America’s Asylum System, 2 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 2 (2007) (“That the 
American asylum system has fallen into disrepute is no longer a significantly contested point of 
debate.”). 
 293. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999). 
 294. See Cox, supra note 292, at 1682 (“[A] variety of ‘streamlining’ procedures designed to 
expedite the processing of immigration cases has further eroded the ability of immigration 
judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals to devote sufficient resources to individual 
cases.”); see also Sydenham B. Alexander III, A Political Response to Crisis in the Immigration 
Courts, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 11–21 (2006) (noting that the 2002 reforms increased the 
caseload for immigration courts and made those courts less careful and thorough); Evelyn H. 
Cruz, Double the Injustice, Twice the Harm: The Impact of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s 
Summary Affirmance Procedures, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 481, 499–501 (2005) (summarizing 
the limitations recent streamlining procedures place on the BIA); John R.B. Palmer, Stephen 
W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of 
Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in 
Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 29–32 (2005) (discussing criticism of the 
procedural changes to the BIA). 
FARBENBLUM IN REVISED PRINTER PROOF.DOC 1/24/2011  11:24:29 AM 
1112 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1059 
be entitled to Chevron deference at all.295 Judge Richard Posner, a 
frequent critic of IJs and the BIA,296 observed that the BIA “is not 
deploying any insights that it might have obtained from adjudicating 
immigration cases.”297 In contrast, structural reforms have resulted in 
an explosion in the number of immigration cases that the courts of 
appeals consider each year.298 Given these changes, it is not clear that 
that the BIA retains sufficiently greater expertise than federal courts 
in the interpretation of the asylum and withholding statutes to justify 
deference. 
3. Interpretation of International Law.  The BIA especially lacks 
expertise in the application of formal treaty interpretation principles 
to determine U.S. obligations under international law.299 As discussed 
in Part III, treaty interpretation is implicated in the construction of 
 
 295. Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 289 (3d Cir. 2004). The Third Circuit limited the 
kinds of BIA decisions entitled to deference. See id. at 297 (“If . . . an individual Board member 
arbitrarily . . . streamlines a case where no Board or binding precedent accepts or rejects an 
alien’s plausible interpretation of an ambiguous statute, we are then left to interpret the statute 
without the BIA having provided its Chevron deference-entitled ‘concrete meaning’ to an 
ambiguous statute.”). The Third Circuit explained, 
Aguirre-Aguirre . . . did not determine that the opinion of an IJ, when affirmed 
without opinion by the BIA’s streamlining process, is entitled to Chevron deference, 
and it does not necessary [sic] follow that such would be the case. . . . [I]t would seem 
to be, at the very least, an open question. 
Id. at 289 n.6. Although the practice of AWO has declined significantly, short opinions by single 
members are now the dominant form of decisionmaking. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra 
note 285, at ES-32. 
 296. See Cox, supra note 292, at 1679–80 (“In recent years, Posner has more and more 
frequently concluded that both the immigration judges . . . and the Board of Immigration 
Appeals . . . are inept.”). 
 297. Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 298. See, e.g., Note, Recent Cases: Immigration Law—Administrative Adjudication—Third 
and Seventh Circuits Condemn Pattern of Error in Immigration Courts—Wang v. Attorney 
General, 423 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2005), and Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005), 
119 HARV. L. REV. 2596, 2596 (2006) (noting that immigration decisions have “swollen in the 
past five years from three percent to eighteen percent of all federal appeals”); Palmer et al., 
supra note 294, at 44–45 (discussing the surge in petitions for review after March 2002). This 
increase has not come without cost for federal judges, who have also been faced with a vastly 
expanded docket. See, e.g., Gerald Seipp & Sophie Feal, Overwhelmed Circuit Courts Lashing 
Out at the BIA and Selected Immigration Judges: Is Streamlining to Blame?, 82 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 2005, 2005 (2005) (describing problems arising from the massive increase in the 
number of immigration cases in 2005). 
 299. Cf. Kane, supra note 6, at 521 (arguing that Chevron deference to BIA determinations 
in religious refugee cases is inappropriate because such claims are not “highly technical”). 
Professor Kane was presumably referring to the assessment of whether particular facts 
constitute religious persecution under established standards, as opposed to the determination of 
those standards. 
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INA asylum and withholding provisions, including those within the 
expanding category interpreted on a case-by-case basis. Deference to 
the BIA in these cases has serious jurisprudential implications beyond 
misconceived interpretations of U.S. immigration law—it risks the 
BIA’s ill-considered determinations influencing the interpretation of 
the Convention for all states parties. Or in the alternative, the lack of 
considered analysis by the BIA risks other states parties 
marginalizing the jurisprudence of the United States in determining 
the accepted interpretation of Convention provisions, leaving the task 
of defining U.S. obligations under the Convention to the judges of 
foreign courts.300 
4. Uniformity.  Although agencies that decide matters through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking may achieve relative interpretive 
consistency, the same is not necessarily true of agencies that rule by 
adjudication. The immigration courts and the BIA regularly fail to 
achieve uniformity in their construction of INA provisions over time. 
Indeed, the authors of an empirical study of IJ determinations across 
the country described the widespread lack of consistency in the 
adjudication of asylum claims as “refugee roulette.”301 The study 
found, for example, that Colombian asylum seekers appearing before 
the Miami immigration court had a 5 percent chance of prevailing 
before one IJ and an 88 percent chance of prevailing before 
another.302 
Tied to general frustration with the poor standard of BIA 
decisionmaking, courts have criticized the agency’s “continually 
competing and definitionally inconsistent constructions” of asylum 
provisions303—though generally as a factor militating against the 
 
 300. See infra Part V.A. 
 301. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 292, at 302 (“[I]n the very large volume of 
adjudications involving foreign nationals’ applications for protection from persecution and 
torture in their home countries, we see a great deal of statistical variation in the outcomes 
pronounced by decision makers.”). 
 302. Id. at 296. 
 303. N-A-M v. Holder, 587 F.3d 1052, 1060 (10th Cir. 2009) (Henry, J., concurring) (noting 
that “the BIA’s continually competing and definitionally inconsistent constructions of § 1231 
frustrate our function as a reviewing court and threaten the reasonableness of its 
interpretations”). The BIA’s AWOs and short opinions by single members further undermine 
its ability to achieve consistency. See COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 285, at ES-32 to -33 
(“The combination of single-member review and lack of detailed decisions has given rise to a 
dearth of Board precedent and guidance for the immigration courts.”); see also Perdomo v. 
Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 663–64 (9th Cir. 2010) (remanding because the BIA’s construction of 
“particular social group” was inconsistent with its own opinions in two previous decisions). 
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reasonableness of a particular BIA interpretation, rather than 
undermining the application of Chevron per se.304 
V.  TOWARD A MORE INTERNATIONALLY ENGAGED  
U.S. JUDICIARY 
A. Reclaiming a Seat at the Table 
This Article has, thus far, focused on the argument for looking to 
international and comparative law in interpreting domestic refugee 
provisions, and the domestic consequences of courts’ failure to do so. 
There is a broader, less often discussed, problem that goes beyond the 
failure of U.S. courts to receive international law. It is the 
concomitant failure of U.S. courts to play a leadership role in the 
creation of international law.305 
By failing to meaningfully engage in the interpretation of 
international refugee law, U.S. courts diminish the relevance of their 
decisions to the interpretation of refugee law by courts of other states 
parties to the Convention. Justice Ginsburg recently observed that 
failing to engage foreign decisions had diminished the global 
influence of the U.S. Supreme Court.306 Indeed, foreign judges have, 
on numerous occasions, remarked on the provinciality of U.S. judges 
because of their reluctance to consider foreign and international law 
compared to their judicial counterparts in other similarly situated 
democratic countries.307 
 
 304. See N-A-M, 587 F.3d at 1060 (Henry, J., concurring); see also Good Samaritan Hosp. v. 
Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993) (“[T]he consistency of an agency’s position is a factor in 
assessing the weight that position is due.”); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 
(1987) (“An agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency’s 
earlier interpretation is ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than a consistently held agency 
view.” (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981))). 
 305. Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization, the Rehnquist 
Court, and Human Rights, in THE REHNQUIST COURT 234, 234–35 (Martin H. Belsky ed., 2002) 
(“[A]s courts look all over the world for sources of authority, the process of international 
influence has changed from reception to dialogue. . . . and dialogue between jurisdictions is 
increasingly occurring. . . . [O]ne large exception to this general . . . trend. . . . [is t]he United 
States Supreme Court.”). 
 306. Adam Liptak, Ginsburg Shares Views on Influence of Foreign Law on Her Court, and 
Vice Versa, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009, at A14. 
 307. Former Chief Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court Aharon Barak observed that “most 
Justices of the United States Supreme Court do not cite foreign case law in their judgments” 
and that the U.S. Supreme Court “is losing the central role it once had among courts in modern 
democracies.” Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court 2001 Term—Foreword: A Judge on Judging: 
The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 27, 114 (2002); see also 
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Several recent Supreme Court opinions308 citing to foreign law 
provide reason for new cautious optimism among judges and scholars 
championing the use of foreign law by the Supreme Court and lower 
federal courts as part of a broader transnational judicial dialogue.309 
Even if that optimism is warranted, however, it does not necessarily 
extend to lower courts, where most judicial construction of domestic 
asylum provisions occurs.310 
Although the failure to consider international and comparative 
law may have general adverse international consequences for U.S. 
courts, it creates a concrete jurisprudential problem in the refugee 
context because of the domestic statute’s derivation from, and 
inextricable link with, a specific international treaty. Thus, in contrast 
to broader debates about the merits of U.S. participation in 
transnational judicial dialogue on constitutional or common-law 
issues, the failure of U.S. judges to engage in a meaningful analysis of 
the treaty’s terms results in an abdication of power to other states to 
shape the meaning of treaty terms that bind all states parties 
(including the United States) under international law. At the very 
least, to legitimately participate in defining international refugee law 
for other states parties, U.S. courts must overcome the dissonance 
between the repeated affirmation that Congress intended domestic 
asylum provisions to be interpreted consistent with U.S. international 
obligations and the increasingly unwarranted tendency to defer to the 
BIA’s “policy choices.”311 
 
L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 305, at 239–40 (reviewing the Rehnquist Court’s international 
impact and critiquing its provinciality). 
 308. Supreme Court Justices have looked to foreign precedent in interpreting the U.S. 
Constitution. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010) (noting the global consensus 
against sentencing juveniles who did not commit homicide to life without parole); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005) (acknowledging that international opinion is 
“overwhelmingly” against the juvenile death penalty); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576–77 
(2003) (noting that other nations have recognized the right of homosexual adults to engage in 
consensual intimate conduct); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (observing 
international disapproval of sentencing mentally retarded offenders to the death penalty). 
 309. See, e.g., Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational 
Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 490 (2005) 
(asserting that national courts worldwide engage in a complex dialogue that creates 
international legal norms). 
 310. See Zaring, supra note 5, at 313–15 (concluding that the increase in federal court 
citations to foreign sources is largely a product of an increase in the absolute number of 
opinions and not a greater reliance on foreign sources). 
 311. See HATHAWAY, supra note 70, at 72–73 (noting that the interpretation of human 
rights treaties should not be directed to advancing the interest of the contracting parties because 
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It is important to recognize that the participation of U.S. courts 
in the definition of Convention terms, though invariably of value to 
U.S. courts, may not always result in the advancement of human 
rights. Unless courts engage in treaty interpretation in a genuine 
effort to preserve the international legality of U.S. practice, it may 
undermine the rights of refugees. The strongest cautionary tale 
concerning U.S. courts’ ability to bend international law to meet 
executive policy demands remains the Supreme Court’s 1993 decision 
in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.312 Several scholars have argued 
that the Sale Court willfully interpreted Article 33 of the Convention 
erroneously to allow the forced repatriation of large numbers of 
Haitian asylum seekers interdicted at sea. This decision was based on 
interpretations of the Convention’s text and drafting history that were 
not particularly plausible—indeed, some have argued that these 
interpretations were adopted with an “attitude of calculated cynicism 
toward international obligation.”313 The UNHCR described the 
Court’s decision as “a setback to modern international refugee law 
which has been developing for more than forty years.”314  
The most significant way to minimize the risks inherent in 
inviting courts to engage in human rights treaty interpretation is by 
fostering a genuine systemic commitment to compliance with (and 
awareness of the fragility of) those treaties. In the domain of refugee 
 
these treaties are designed to limit state sovereignty and advance more general goals for the 
international community). 
 312. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993). Sale concerned the legality of a 
presidential order to the Coast Guard. Id. at 158. The order required the Coast Guard to 
intercept ships outside U.S. waters that were transporting Haitians to the United States and to 
forcibly repatriate those passengers to Haiti, without first determining whether they qualified as 
refugees. Id. The court upheld the validity of the order. Id. at 159. Because Sale was a direct 
challenge that did not arise in the course of removal proceedings, it did not raise Chevron issues 
and therefore is not discussed at length in this Article. 
 313. Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 10; see also Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United 
States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 4, 28 (1995) (criticizing the Sale Court’s failure to use 
appropriate treaty interpretation methods); Thomas David Jones, International Decisions, Sale 
v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993), 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 114, 122 (1994) 
(describing the Court’s analysis of the Convention in Sale as judicial activism that was 
analytically “flawed in numerous respects”); Louis Henkin, Notes from the President, 
NEWSLETTER (Am. Soc’y Int’l L., Washington, D.C.), Sept.–Oct. 1993, at 1, 7–8 (criticizing Sale 
as an “eccentric, highly implausible” interpretation of a treaty). 
 314. Haitian Asylum-Seekers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Law, 
Immigration, and Refugees of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 335 (1994). The 
UNHCR observed that Sale was “contrary to the views of the UNHCR’s Executive Committee 
that refugees should not be refused entry to a country where they are seeking asylum, and that 
asylum seekers rescued at sea should always be admitted, at least on a temporary basis.” Id. 
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law, two of the most significant obstacles to constructive judicial 
engagement in treaty interpretation can be addressed with greater 
ease than is generally supposed. These obstacles are, first, the 
perception by U.S. courts that international law is indeterminate and 
not capable of systematic interpretation and, second, the tendency of 
government lawyers to take litigation positions that are incompatible 
with international law out of fear of intrusion on executive power. 
B. Challenges Can Be Overcome 
1. Domestic Courts and the Perception of Indeterminacy.  Despite 
the risk of courts manipulating international law, in general the 
formal and rule-oriented nature of treaty interpretation is intended 
“to generate dependable and rights-regarding results.”315 But federal 
judges often perceive that if the meaning of a Convention provision is 
not clear on its face, then it is indeterminate or not amenable to 
systematic interpretation.316 Indeed, instead of viewing apparent 
ambiguity in treaty language as an invitation to interpret the treaty, 
many judges view it as a legitimate basis for setting international law 
aside in favor of more familiar domestic sources of statutory 
interpretation.317 This concern is overblown and stems from a lack of 
familiarity with international law and treaty interpretation principles, 
and the dearth of resources and expertise to conduct the relevant 
research. 
Federal courts are as capable as their foreign counterparts of 
analyzing the meaning of ambiguous treaty provisions in light of the 
treaty’s object and purpose and in the context of the treaty’s drafting 
history and subsequent interpretation by states parties, scholars, and 
the UNHCR.318 Indeed, when U.S. law is dependent on an 
international treaty, courts have sometimes been more receptive to 
(and capable of) examining the treaty’s purpose and its interpretation 
by other states parties than they have been in relation to questions of 
constitutional or common law.319 Most recently, for example, most of 
 
 315. HATHAWAY, supra note 70, at 48. 
 316. See supra text accompanying notes 129–30. 
 317. See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text. 
 318. For a discussion of treaty interpretation principles that have been recognized by U.S. 
courts, see supra Part I.A.4. 
 319. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 626–36 (2006) (considering international 
sources to interpret the meaning of various provisions of the Geneva Conventions); Air France 
v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985) (“[W]e ‘find the opinions of our sister signatories to be entitled 
to considerable weight.’” (quoting Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 919 
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the Supreme Court (including Justice Scalia)320 demonstrated its 
ability and willingness to grapple with the interpretation of the 
undefined term “rights of custody” under the Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction321 during oral 
argument in an international child custody case.322 Argument focused 
on the purpose of the treaty, the circumstances surrounding its 
passage, and its interpretation by other states parties.323 The Eleventh 
Circuit has been similarly guided by the treaty in interpreting the 
same phrase, observing that “in applying the Hague Convention, ‘we 
must look to the definition of rights of custody set forth in the 
Convention and not allow our somewhat different American concepts 
of custody to cloud our application of the Convention’s terms.’”324 
There is nothing peculiar to the Refugees Convention that makes it 
more difficult to interpret using ordinary principles of treaty 
interpretation. 
In many cases, courts can only fulfill their role of reviewing BIA 
construction of domestic asylum and withholding provisions by first 
establishing the meaning of treaty provisions with which Congress 
 
(2d Cir. 1978))); N-A-M v. Holder, 587 F.3d 1052, 1062 (10th Cir. 2009) (Henry, J., concurring) 
(“We can also benefit from reference to international law, as it reveals how other tribunals have 
interpreted the exact same text. . . . [T]he broad consensus, even among opponents of its use in 
constitutional law cases, supports its use when determining how other signatories on a treaty 
interpret that treaty.”). 
 320. Although dissenting in Hamdan, Justice Scalia has supported the use of foreign 
jurisprudence in treaty interpretation on other occasions. See, e.g., Olympic Airways v. Husain, 
540 U.S. 644, 658 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority because their “decision 
stands out for its failure to give any serious consideration to how the courts of our treaty 
partners have resolved the legal issues before us” and noting specifically that “[w]ithin the past 
year, appellate courts in both England and Australia have rendered decisions squarely at odds 
with today’s holding”). 
 321. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 
1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89. 
 322. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–8, Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010) (No. 
08-645), 2010 WL 97480. 
 323. See generally id. Justice Sotomayor queried whether “anything in the history of the 
negotiation and passage of the [treaty] . . . reflect[ed] what the U.S.’s position was on this 
particular issue.” Id. at 27. Several Justices queried about the intention of the drafters and 
signatories to the Convention. Id. at 38, 55–56. Even Justice Scalia, one of the Court’s most 
vocal opponents to citing foreign law in the constitutional context, examined the positions of the 
treaty’s other signatory countries, observing that “the purpose of a treaty is to have everybody 
doing the same thing.” Id. at 43–44. Although appearing to value consistency over giving effect 
to the purpose of the treaty, Justice Scalia responded to counsel’s suggestion that domestic law 
may remedy the situation with the retort that “[i]f these local remedies were effective, we 
wouldn’t have a treaty.” Id. at 49. 
 324. Hanley v. Roy, 485 F.3d 641, 646–47 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Furnes v. Reeves, 362 
F.3d 702, 711 (11th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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intended domestic legislation to comply. But as a practical matter, the 
interpretive sources for the Convention are not always easy to locate. 
International legal research can be a time-consuming exercise—and 
one which federal judges (and their clerks) may not be trained to 
undertake.325 Thus, the level to which courts engage in treaty analysis 
depends heavily on the extent to which counsel for asylum seekers 
(and more often amicus curiae) brief the courts on the Convention 
and its interpretive sources.326 The task of interpreting international 
sources would also be made easier by systemic judicial training in this 
area. 
2. Overcoming Reactive Government Litigation Positions.  A 
second concern is that DHS attorneys—and on appeal, attorneys in 
the Department of Justice’s Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL)—
frequently adopt litigation positions that are inconsistent with 
international refugee law, apparently motivated by a desire to 
maximize executive power and discretion.327 Those litigation positions 
have significantly contributed to the BIA interpreting domestic 
asylum provisions inconsistently with U.S. obligations under 
international law. Whether out of instinctive deference to the 
government or motivated by other concerns, IJs and the BIA 
frequently adopt the government’s litigation position regardless of its 
inconsistency with international law. In a recent case in which the 
BIA upheld the IJ’s decision, for example, one circuit judge observed 
 
 325. Much has changed since Joseph L. Kunz wrote A Plea for More Study of International 
Law in American Law Schools, 40 AM. J. INT’L L. 624 (1946), which lamented that the political 
science departments of most American universities taught international law, but their law 
schools did not. Id. at 624. Although the overwhelming majority of U.S. law schools now teach 
international law, very few require students to take it as part of a law degree. 
 326. From personal experience, attorneys are often fearful of introducing too much 
complexity into arguments based on the Convention, lest judges avoid the subject altogether as 
either too hard or too foreign. It is precisely this oversimplification—for example, advocating a 
particular interpretation based only on the views of the UNHCR Handbook—that has caused 
judges to reject international legal sources as irrelevant or categorically inferior to BIA 
determinations. See supra notes 323–24 and accompanying text. It also exposes the UNHCR’s 
position as amicus curiae to easier marginalization, and makes its briefing task more difficult. 
 327. See OIL, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Where O’ Where Has the Eleventh Circuit Gone?, 
IMMIGR. LITIG. BULL., June 2010, at 3, 3 (analyzing the “declining percentage of published 
asylum-related wins” for the government in the Eleventh Circuit to enable OIL attorneys to 
achieve “greater success”—defined as a greater percentage of government victories—in future 
asylum appeals); see also Kang v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2010) (expressing 
distress that OIL pursued its appeal of the IJ’s finding of a likelihood of torture to the BIA and 
the court of appeals with such zeal that it failed to seek “justice rather than victory”). 
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that “the IJ could not be bothered to do more than copy and paste 
swaths of the government’s briefs.”328 
Yet it is apparent that this reactive stance may not be in keeping 
with the policy preferences and objectives of the current executive 
with respect to international law—and human rights treaties in 
particular.329 In this sense, this apparent hurdle may no longer be as 
insurmountable as it appeared in previous years. As a new 
administration rethinks the engagement of the United States with 
international law and human rights treaties and institutions more 
broadly330 and recognizes that “the promotion of human rights cannot 
be about exhortation alone,”331 it is appropriate for it to examine the 
approach that its attorneys take with respect to construction of the 
INA in removal proceedings. Given the number of cases OIL and 
DHS attorneys handle each year that do not attract high-level 
scrutiny, the new administration’s goals would be well served by a 
pragmatic yet transformative policy of ensuring that government 
 
 328. Parlak v. Holder, 578 F.3d 457, 480 (6th Cir. 2009) (Martin, J., dissenting). Judge Boyce 
Martin noted the particular perils of this rubber-stamping in the recent “era of paranoid, 
overzealous, error-riddled, and misguided anti-terrorism and immigration enforcement.” Id. at 
481. 
 329. This problem further undermines Posner and Sunstein’s argument that courts should 
defer to executive decisions interpreting statutes in a manner inconsistent with international law 
on the basis of the executive’s foreign relations expertise and its political accountability by 
virtue of its connection with the president. See supra text accompanying notes 241–46. 
 330. In 2009, the United States signed the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, its first human rights treaty in over a decade. Further, when presenting its 
candidacy for election to the U.N. Human Rights Council in April 2009, it pledged to consider 
the possible ratification of human rights treaties, including but not limited to, the U.N. 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which it signed 
in 1980. See Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the 
United Nations, to the President of the General Assembly, at 4–5 U.N. Doc. A/63/831 (Apr. 24, 
2009) (presenting the United States’ candidacy for membership in the United Nations Human 
Rights Council). The legislature has embarked on a similar process; on December 16, 2009, the 
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law held its first-ever hearing on 
U.S. compliance with the nation’s human rights treaty obligations. It received detailed 
submissions from almost sixty organizations across the country. For copies of the submissions 
and a transcript, see The Law of the Land: U.S. Implementation of Human Rights Treaties, U.S. 
SENATE (Dec. 16, 2009), http://durbin.senate.gov/humanRights/treatiesHearing.cfm. And the 
U.S. government has actively engaged in the U.N. Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic 
Review Process. See Statement of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Human 
Rights Council 15th Session (Sep. 23, 2010) (“Preparing for our own UPR session . . . . [w]e 
conducted unprecedented consultations in more than ten cities across the country, to examine 
practical human rights issues facing our citizens in a new and novel manner.”). 
 331. Barack H. Obama, U.S. President, Nobel Lecture: A Just and Lasting Peace (Dec. 10, 
2009), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture_en.
html. 
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litigation positions reflect an interpretation of domestic refugee law 
that is consistent with international law. 
Such a litigation position would accord with the Supreme Court’s 
clear findings over the past three decades that the Refugee Act was 
intended to conform U.S. immigration law to the nation’s obligations 
under the Protocol. It would also leave government attorneys free to 
propose interpretations of the Convention contrary to those 
advocated by asylum seekers, provided they do so as part of a bona 
fide attempt to comply with international law and that they take into 
account the BIA’s determination a decade and a half ago that 
Congress intended a presumption in favor of refugee protection in 
cases of doubt.332 
CONCLUSION 
Interpreting the INA consistently with the Convention will 
invariably provide a more rights-protective framework than the 
domestic immigration statute alone. This framework better reflects 
congressional intent and the United States’ international commitment 
to safeguarding the human rights of people seeking protection from 
persecution. Consistent with congressional intent, courts may reject 
BIA constructions of domestic asylum and withholding provisions on 
the basis that they are inconsistent with the Convention. They may do 
so despite the Chevron doctrine. Under current Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, courts may find that, absent clear statutory language to 
the contrary, a construction that is incompatible with international 
law on the Convention is inconsistent with clear congressional intent 
to conform domestic refugee law with the nation’s obligations under 
the Protocol and, therefore, is not entitled to deference under 
Chevron step one. Or at a minimum, courts may determine that a 
construction inconsistent with international law is unreasonable 
under Chevron step two because it violates statutory construction 
principles assuming consistency with international law and U.S. treaty 
obligations. Alternately, in light of deficient IJ and BIA 
decisionmaking processes, the Supreme Court may be encouraged to 
consider whether the agency expertise and public accountability 
rationales underpinning Chevron can justify deference to those 
 
 332. See In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 492 (B.I.A. 1996) (“In enacting the Refugee Act of 
1980, Congress sought to bring the Act’s definition of ‘refugee’ into conformity with the United 
Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees . . . . Such an approach is 
designed to afford a generous standard for protection in cases of doubt.” (citations omitted)). 
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agencies at all. More modestly, courts may consider whether 
problems with those rationales undermine the reasonableness of the 
BIA’s statutory construction under Chevron step two in a particular 
case. Regardless of the path courts take, they have jurisdiction to 
ensure that U.S. asylum and withholding statutes are interpreted 
consistently with the letter and spirit of the Convention, as Congress 
intended. 
